Abstract

Previous studies have failed to recognize the difference between parent control over its ‘own people’ and ‘otherpeople’ in IJVs. The paper for the first time in the literature separates parent control into two modes of control–inside and outside control upon the nature of the relationship between parents and respective IJV managementteams. We examine inside and outside control through an analytical inductive case study. Our result shows thatinside control determined by parent ownership is an endogenous contingent control. It has a broad but selectivecontrol focus. It gives a parent adaptability and flexibility in selecting control extent and mechanisms. Outsidecontrol is determined by parent overall bargaining power. It is a pre-determined control with a narrow specificfocus, and its control extent and mechanisms are predefined. Our study contributes to the literature on IJVcontrol by adding the nature of the relationship between parents and individual management groups into the IJVcontrol equation, unveiling two distinctive forms of control within IJVs.

Highlights

  • Despite the rapid growth of international joint ventures (IJVs) in terms of both frequency and strategic importance, the estimate 30%-70% failure rate indicates that it is very difficult to run an IJV (Hennart & Zeng, 2002)

  • The IJV is governed by the Board of Directors (BOD) through a series of formal agreements

  • Our core theoretical contribution is a holistic classification of parent control into two modes of control- inside and outside control based on the nature of the relationships between parents and IJV management groups

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Summary

Introduction

Despite the rapid growth of international joint ventures (IJVs) in terms of both frequency and strategic importance, the estimate 30%-70% failure rate indicates that it is very difficult to run an IJV (Hennart & Zeng, 2002). Control in the context of IJVs refers to the process by which one entity influences, to varying degrees, the behavior and output of another entity through the use of power, authority and a wide range of bureaucratic, cultural, and informal mechanisms (Geringer & Hebert, 1989). This control makes IJV activities more predictable, thereby decreasing the uncertainty but increasing the likelihood of reaching a desired goal (Ding, 1997; Emsley & Kidon, 2007; Groot & Merchant, 2000). The amount of ownership does give a parent an ability to appoint their personnel to key positions in IJVs (Groot & Merchant, 2000; Mjoen &Tallman, 1997; Wang, Wee and Koh, 1998; Yan & Gray, 1994)

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