Tort Law and Distributive Justice

Abstract

It is sometimes said that corrective justice is more important to the normative foundation of tort law than distributive justice. This chapter argues that tort law's distributive justice is corrective justice, offering an account of the Aristotelian distinction in which corrective justice is a distinct principle of distributive justice, one that requires redistributing interest-affecting consequences of directed wrongful interactions in ways that reflects its wrong-making features. The chapter applies the account to tort law, showing how it can help understand liability to repair harm. It also tries to say what the availability of insurance against such liability means and doesn’t mean for corrective justice. It then examines the implications of the account for understanding competing claims about the relative place of corrective and distributive justice in the justification of tort law. Concluding, it offers one way to understand the justificatory priority of corrective justice and remarking on its possible repercussions.