Abstract

ABSTRACT In his essay, “Of the Nature of That Imitation Which Takes Place in What Are Called the Imitative Arts,” Adam Smith discusses two examples, topiary and false jewels, apparently coming to opposed conclusions: that aesthetic value is, and that it is not, independent of market value. I unpack the reasoning behind these conclusions, arguing that Smith’s position is consistent: he recognizes that aesthetic value can be occluded by market prices—as when one dismisses the beauty of something cheap out of snobbery—or heightened by them, as in the case of the aesthetic value of magnificence. Because aesthetic value can thus be heightened or corrupted by market value on Smith’s analysis, I suggest, speculatively, that for Smith the bad influence of economic considerations in aesthetic matters (faulty snobbery or an economically-derived corruption of taste) is identified by reference to moral, not purely aesthetic criteria.

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