To the question of the legal essence of the civil term. Its correlation with legal facts

Abstract

This article is devoted to the scientific study of the civil law term and its distinction from such a legal phenomenon as a legal fact. It was established that the term itself is not a legal fact, but only reflects its temporal essence as an element. The expiration or beginning of a term is a certain legal event. But not all actions or events that occur when determining the content of material legal relations have the meaning of legal facts. For example, the actions to agree the terms of the deed, which precede its conclusion, do not contain such a property, because they do not directly form property relations. So, those phenomena external to the deed, which affect its course, can be qualified as legal facts. The term is not such a factor, because it cannot begin or end at all, when the movement of the legal relationship is not determined by the deed, acts of the state, the judiciary, other actions and events specified in Art. 11 of the CCU as the basis for the emergence of civil rights and obligations. It is not the beginning of the term that determines the emergence of an objective right, but a certain action, which is manifested in the clearly expressed will of the legislation to grant a person certain powers of exactly this content and exactly this duration. The arrival of the moment of the given right is a consequence of this action and determines the time limits of the right. Both the beginning and the expiration of the term, as indicated above, are products of other legal facts, and their nature does not depend on the temporal distance from the latter. Not the beginning of the term will be the legal basis for the emergence of a subjective right, but the same deed. The term starting from the stipulated date, as well as other internal characteristics of the acquired authority, will be the consequences of a specific legal fact. The same should be said about such an event as the expiration of the established period. The termination of the temporal limits of subjective law has the same consequences as the termination (exhaustion) of its physical features. This indisputable thesis is illustrated in the work with concrete examples from practice. The article critically evaluates certain journalistic messages, which boil down to mixing objective law (which, indeed, can arise with the onset of temporal manifestations) and subjective law, which arises, changes and ceases only as a result of the influence on the legal status of classical legal facts.