Abstract
There are parallels between the run-up to the United States’ entry into the Second World War in 1941 and the contemporary geopolitical environment. Authoritarian aggression has again produced war in Europe and threatens conflict in Asia. While new research on the path to war in December 1941 offers no neatly packaged lessons, it does present five enduring dilemmas. Firstly, it only takes one side to believe war is inevitable for it to materialise. Secondly, a combatant might regard a state’s characterisation of economic-defence aid to an adversary combatant as a measure short of war as a distinction without a difference. Thirdly, underlying but unrealised military primacy might encourage rather than deter war by making time a critical factor. Fourthly, domestic constraints can make it difficult for a government to make deterrence credible. Fifthly, and relatedly, a democratic leader cannot make durable policies that get too far ahead of public opinion.
Talk to us
Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have
Schedule a callDisclaimer: All third-party content on this website/platform is and will remain the property of their respective owners and is provided on "as is" basis without any warranties, express or implied. Use of third-party content does not indicate any affiliation, sponsorship with or endorsement by them. Any references to third-party content is to identify the corresponding services and shall be considered fair use under The CopyrightLaw.
