Thunder Alone Does Not Defeat an Enemy: An Analysis of Airpower in Vietnam

Abstract

Operation Rolling Thunder is among the most well-known aerial operations in the Vietnam War, if not all of military history. However, that recognition originates more from infamy than achievement. The massive employment of ordinances, manpower, capital and military logistics did not yield the results desired by the American top brass, instead, the war in Vietnam only intensified with mounting American casualties and growing anti-war sentiments. To be concise, it was a failure. This paper aims to analyze 1) how Operation Rolling Thunder was executed, 2) why it was conducted that way, and 3) what therein should be blamed for the disastrous results mentioned earlier. The objective of the paper is to provide relevant suggestions for the use of airpower based on the experiences of Operation Rolling Thunder. This paper dissects Operation Rolling Thunder by its context, execution, and efficacy to demonstrate the usefulness air power had in the war. The operation was poorly planned and done in almost all major aspects, and the results were similarly poor. Airpower failed to be an effective political tool in this case as it failed to bring the North Vietnamese government to the negotiating table. The research employs a qualitative historical analysis, drawing from established military doctrines, primary sources such as U.S. governmental documents, and secondary scholarly discussions. Findings indicate that the gradual escalation strategy, political mismanagement, and lack of coordination with ground forces were key factors contributing to the operation's failure. The study concludes by offering recommendations for the effective use of airpower in modern military campaigns, demonstrating that airpower must be deployed in concert with other military assets to achieve political objectives.