Abstract

One of the most controversial methods of philosophy is the use of thought experiments. If, on the one hand, philosophers usually agree that a hypothetical reasoning or an imaginative example can refute a previously well-supported theory or hypothesis, on the other there is a strong skepticism about the use of thought experiments in Philosophy. The skepticism is reinforced by the fact that scientific thought experiments are profoundly influenced by the expectation that the outcome of a thought experiment may reflect the outcome of an actual experiment, whereas in Philosophy the use of this tool does not necessarily reflects what happens in the world. In other words, scientific thought experiments seem to have well delimited criteria, while philosophical thought experiments do not. In this work I will argue in favor of the thesis that not all thought experiments are disguised arguments, but that nevertheless they should not be considered as lacking in criteria of correction.

Highlights

  • One of the most controversial methods of philosophy is the use of thought experiments

  • The skepticism is reinforced by the fact that scientific thought experiments are profoundly influenced by the expectation that the outcome of a thought experiment may reflect the outcome of an actual experiment, whereas in Philosophy the use of this tool does not necessarily reflects what happens in the world

  • This perspective has gained a great deal of attention from the philosophical community, I think that the conversion or translation suggested by Norton would bring about a great loss in terms of the persuasive force that many of philosophical thought experiments possess

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Summary

Introduction

One of the most controversial methods of philosophy is the use of thought experiments. One of the most influential strategies was presented by John Norton, who’s the central idea was that thought experiments are “disguised arguments” In this sense, all thought experiments should be converted into arguments so that, with the help of our usual rules of inference, to ascertain whether thought experiments are useful to lead us to true conclusions from some imagined scenario. All thought experiments should be converted into arguments so that, with the help of our usual rules of inference, to ascertain whether thought experiments are useful to lead us to true conclusions from some imagined scenario This perspective has gained a great deal of attention from the philosophical community, I think that the conversion or translation suggested by Norton would bring about a great loss in terms of the persuasive force that many of philosophical thought experiments possess. I will argue in this paper that not all thought experiments can be converted into arguments and that this fact does not imply that there are no criteria to evaluate them

What are thought experiments?
Thought Experiments and Disguised Arguments
The Persuasive Force of Thought Experiments
The role of thought experiments is providing understanding
Concluding Remarks

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