Abstract
Primate theories of primate minds : conceptual and methodological issues Casual observation of spontaneous behaviours in non-human primates (especially apes) reveals complex social behaviours that appear to be symptomatic of some Theory-of-mind abilities. However, when experimentally tested, their performance fails to convince experts of their having any real ability to understand mental states. In this paper I suggest reasons for this paradox : First, there might be some methodological inadequacies in the experimental procedures developed to assess tom functions with non-verbal procedures. Secondly, there is a conceptual confusion about what is meant by having a theory-of-mind in non-human primates and therefore what should count as evidence of mentalising abilities in non-human primates. I consider some possible avenues for future studies of non-human mentalism that are capable of overcoming these problems. I present some recent studies that avoid the pitfalls of extensive preliminary training and favour the spontaneous performance of apes. Secondly, I discuss the notion of having an implicit theory of mind as the proper level to conceptualise apes' mentalism and suggest some implications of these comparative studies for our understanding of human theories of mind.
Published Version
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