Thirty Years in a Red House: A Memoir of Childhood and Youth in Communist China (review)

Click to increase image sizeClick to decrease image size Acknowledgement This research was successively supported by an Overseas Research Student Award of the UK and National Natural Science Foundation of China (NSFC) (No. 51008137). Notes 1. Mao Tse-tung, 'Some Experiences in Our Party's History (September 25, 1956)', in Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung. Vol. 5 (Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1961). 2. Jack C. Westoby, '''Making Green the Motherland'': Forestry in China', in China's Road to Development, Neville Maxwell, ed. (Oxford: Pergamon, 1979), pp. 231–245. 3. Zhao Jijun 赵纪军, 'Sixty Years of Landscape Policies and Development in China (3): Making Green the Motherland' 新中国园林政策与建设 60年回眸(三)—绿化祖国. Landscape Architecture, 3, 2009, pp. 91–95. 4. The Mao era was considered in this study as from 1949 to 1978 despite Mao's death in 1976, since Hua Guofeng (1921–2008) who succeed as the chairman continued Mao's political orientation and policies by claiming that 'to support whatever policy decisions were made by Chairman Mao' and 'unswervingly follow whatever instructions were given by Chairman Mao'. A clear diversion of the policy was only made from the end of 1978 when the Reform and Opening-up Policy was initiated under the leadership of Deng Xiaoping (1904–1997). 5. For example, it was noted that foreigners visiting China during the Mao era were always subjected to tightly controlled itineraries to pilot projects, according to an interview with Professor Wang Shaozeng, currently editor of Chinese Landscape Architecture, 12 June 2009. This was also mentioned in: Anne-Marie Broudehoux, The Making and Selling of Post-Mao Beijing (London, New York: Routledge, 2004), pp. 30–32. 6. The Third Internal Revolutionary War, commonly known as the War of Liberation (1945–1949), was fought between the Chinese Nationalist Party and the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). The latter led by Mao Zedong defeated the former in mainland China where the founding of the People's Republic of China was announced on 1 October 1949 on Tiananmen, Beijing. 7. Joseph W. Esherick, Remaking the Chinese City: Modernity and National Identity, 1900–1950 (Honolulu: University of Hawai' Press, 2000), p. 1. 8. Lu Duanfang, Remaking Chinese Urban Form: Modernity, Scarcity and Space, 1949–2005 (London: Routledge, Taylor & Francis Group, 2006), p. 6. 9. 'National Landscaping and Gardening Movement' is a translation of 'Dadi yuanlin hua' in Editorial Board of Chinese Agricultural Encyclopaedia, Gardening Volume 中国农业百科全书总编辑委员会观赏园艺卷编辑委员会,中国农业百科全书编辑部, ed. Chinese Agricultural Encyclopaedia, Gardening Volume 中国农业百科全书,观赏园艺卷 (Beijing: Agricultural Press, 1996), p. 58. 10. 'Speed up greening construction, advance afforestation quality' 加快绿化速度,提高造林质量. People's Daily (9 March 1959). Author's translation. 11. The phrase 'landscape profession' was used in this research for a better communication in the English context, as the latter equate for the Chinese to what is meant by the former in the West. 12. Mao Tse-tung, 'Oppose Stereotyped Party Writing (February 8, 1942)', in Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung. Vol. 3 (Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1965), p. 63. 13. Keishu Saneto 实藤惠秀, A History of Chinese Studying in Japan 中国人留学日本史. trans. Tan Ruqian 谭汝谦, Lin Qiyan 林启彦 (Beijing: Sanlian Bookstore, 1956), p. 334. 14. Department of Landscape of Tokyo University of Agriculture 東京農業大学造園学科, 2nd ed. Landscape Dictionary 造園用語辞典 (Syokoku publication, 2002). 15. It is therefore not correct to consider that the Chinese term, lühua, might be a result of the translation of the corresponding Russian term in the 1950s, as some studies suggested. See: Lin Guangsi 林广思, 'Review and Prospect: A Study of the Landscape Architecture Education in China (1)' 回顾与展望—中国LA学科教育研讨 (1). Chinese Landscape Architecture, 9, 2005, pp. 1–8. 16. Zhang Guoqiang 张国强, 'How old is the word yuanlin?' '园林'一词有多早? Chinese Landscape Architecture, 6, 2007, p. 7. 17. Chen Zhi 陈植, Collected Works on Landscape Architecture of Chen Zhi 陈植造园文集 (Beijing: China Architecture and Building Press, 1988), pp. 175–181. 18. 'Towards National Landscaping and Gardening' 向大地园林化前进. People's Daily (27 March 1959); China Forestry Press. National Landscaping and Gardening (Vol. 1) 大地园林化(第一辑) (Beijing: China Forestry Press, 1959), p. 1. 19. Wang Shaozeng 王绍增, 'Justification of name: re-discussion of Chinese translation of Landscape Architecture (LA)' 必也正名乎—再论LA的中译名. Chinese Landscape Architecture, 6, 1999, pp. 49–51. 20. Zhao Songqiao, Geography of China: Environment, Resources, Population, and Development (New York; Chichester: Wiley, 1994), p. 74. 21. Jack C. Westoby, '''Making Green the Motherland'': Forestry in China', in China's Road to Development, Neville Maxwell, ed. (Oxford: Pergamon, 1979), p. 236. 22. Sun Zhongshan 孙中山, 'Statement to Li Hongzhang (June, 1894)' 上李鸿章书(—八九四年六月), in The Complete Works of Sun Zhongshan. Vol. 1 (1890-1911) 孙中山 全集 (第一卷, 1890–1911) (Beijing: Zhonghua Book Company, 1981), pp. 8–18. 23. Traditionally, over 80% of the total population consisted of farmers, which has remained the case till the modern era. At the time of CCP's 1949 takeover, about 480 million of the total 540 million population were peasants. See Zhao Songqiao, Geography of China: Environment, Resources, Population, and Development (New York; Chichester: Wiley, 1994), p. 69; Tien H. Yuan, China's Population Struggle: Demographic Decisions of the People's Republic, 1949–1969 (Columbus, OH: Ohio State University Press, 1973), p. 43. 24. National Programme for Agricultural Development 1956–1967 (Peking: Foreign Language Press, 1960), p. 18. 25. China Forestry Press 中国林业出版社, Let Us Make Green the Four-Side 我们来绿化四旁 (Beijing: China Forestry Press, 1958). 26. Interview with Professor Zhu Junzhen, one of the graduates in the early 1950s from China's first landscape architecture programme, 8 October 2005. She also mentioned stamp-like residential parks, which so appeared on plans of residential areas. This also indicated that greening would normally be done after the completion of building constructions. 27. 'Making Green the Motherland' 绿化祖国. People's Daily (17 February 1956). 28. Liu Chieh, 'Our country's forest wealth'. China Reconstructs, IV/8, August 1955, p. 18. 29. The Chinese text is '自己动手,丰衣足食'. Mao Tse-tung, 'Get Organized! (November 29, 1943)', in Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung. Vol. 3 (Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1965), p. 154. 30. 'A new ''Great Wall'' of trees'. China Reconstructs, I/3, May-June 1952, pp. 42–44. 31. Publicity Department of the Forestry Ministry of the People's Republic of China 中华人民共和国林业部宣传科, Making Green the Motherland 绿化祖国 (Beijing: Chinese Society of Science and Technology Popularization, 1956), p. 14. 32. For example, Jia Yi (贾谊, 200–168 bc) in his article 'On the Faults of Qin (过秦论)' wrote, 'Sovereign and subject, firmly entrenched in defence, eyed the House of Zhou, with thoughts of rolling up the empire like a mat, enveloping all in the universe, pocketing everything within the four seas, and swallowing all in the eight directions'. (君臣固守以窥周室,有席卷天下,包举宇内,囊括四海之意,并吞八荒之心) Translated in http://en.wikisource.org/wiki/User:Yeu_Ninje/Sandbox. Accessed 24 July 2012. 33. The phrase was referred to in one of Mao's poems in 1963, which read 'The Four Seas are rising, clouds and waters raging. The Five Continents are rocking, wind and thunder roaring'. The Chinese sentences are '四海翻腾云水怒,五洲震荡风雷激'. Translated in Christopher L. Salter, 'In memoriam: selected landscape poetry of Mao Tse-Tung'. The China Geographer, No. 5, Fall, 1976, p. 62. 34. 'Man wins over ''fate'''. China Reconstructs, I/1, January-February 1952, p. 38. 35. Publicity Department of the Forestry Ministry of the People's Republic of China 中华人民共和国林业部宣传科, Making Green the Motherland 绿化祖国 (Beijing: Chinese Society of Science and Technology Popularization, 1956), p. 10. 36. Liu Chieh. 'Our country's forest wealth', China Reconstructs, IV/8, August 1955, pp. 18–21. 37. 'To accomplish ''hundred, thousand, ten thousand'', forestry cadres should try to outdo the others' 实现' 百千万' ,林业干部要争先, in Forestry Ministry of the People's Republic of China 中华人民共和国林业部, The High Tide of Making Green the Motherland (Vol. 1) 绿化祖国的高潮(第一辑) (Beijing: China Forestry Press, 1958), pp. 9–11. 'mu' is a unit of area in China. One mu is equivalent to 1/15 hectare or 1/6 acre. 38. Liu Qingquan 刘清泉, 'From Four-Side Greening to Whole Land Greening' 由四旁绿化到全境绿化, in China Forestry Press 中国林业出版社, Let Us Make Green the Four-Side 我们来绿化四旁 (Beijing: China Forestry Press, 1958), pp. 7–16. 39. Mao Tse-tung, 'On the Correct Handling of Contradictions among the People (February 27, 1957)', in Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung, Vol. 5 (Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1961), p. 419. 40. The Eight-Character Principle is in Chinese '调整,巩固,充实,提高'. 41. Maurice Meisner, Mao's China and After: A History of the People's Republic (New York: Free Press, 1999), pp. 245–259. 42. Zhao Jijun and Jan Woudstra, 'In Agriculture, Learn from Dazhai' : Mao Zedong's Revolutionary Model Village and the Battle against Nature. Landscape Research, 32/2, April 2007, pp. 171–205. 43. Hua Linmao 华林茂, 'Striving for afforestation, Making Green the Motherland' 植树造林,绿化祖国. People's Daily (8 March 1972). 44. Edwin T. Morris, The Gardens of China: History, Art, and Meanings (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1983), p. 25. 45. The Forestry Ministry of the People's Republic of China 中华人民共和国林业部, A Collection of Statistics of Chinese Forestry (1949–1987) 全国林业统计资料汇编 (1949–1987) (Beijing: China Forestry Press, 1990). 46. China Forestry Society 中国林学会, The Development of China's Forestry 中国森林的变迁 (Beijing: China Forestry Press, 1997), p. 54. 47. Some articles during the Cultural Revolution referred to the vision of a 'sea', such as: 'A picturesque forest "sea" of Gaofeng Mountain' 高峰山林海如画. People's Daily (6 January 1973); 'A forest "sea" in Taihang Mountain' 太行山上一林海. Hebei Daily (2 April 1973). 48. There was no reference to the 'Great Wall' in publications about afforestation during the Cultural Revolution, such as: Hua Linmao 华林茂, 'Striving for afforestation, Making Green the Motherland' 植树造林,绿化祖国. People's Daily (8 March 1972); Forestry Department of the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry of the People's Republic of China 中华人民共和国农林部林业组, Making Green the Motherland (Vol. 5) 绿化祖国(第五集) (Beijing: Agricultural Press, 1973); Forestry Bureau of the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry 农林部林业局, Making Green the Motherland (Vol. 7) 绿化祖国(第七集) (Beijing: Agricultural Press, 1974); Forestry Bureau of the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry 农林部林业局, Making Green the Motherland (Vol. 9) 绿化祖国(第九集) (Beijing: Agricultural Press, 1976). 49. Department of Resources and Forest Management of the Forestry Ministry 林业部资源和林政管理司, Survey of Contemporary Chinese Forest Resources (1949–1993) 当代中国森林资源概况 (1949–1993) (Beijing: China Forestry Press, 1996), p. 3; Editorial Board of Forest of China 《中国森林》编辑委员会, Forest of China (Vol. 1) 中国森林 (第1卷) (Beijing: China Forestry Press, 1997), p. 206. 50. Interview with Professor Wang Shaozeng, 12 June 2009. 51. Beijing Municipal Bureau of Parks 北京市园林局, A Collection of Working Experiences in Beijing Landscape Architecture (1949–1959) 北京市园林工作经验汇编 (1949–1959) (Beijing: Beijing Municipal Bureau of Parks, 1960), p. 2. 52. Beijing Municipal Bureau of Parks 北京市园林局, A History of Beijing Modern Landscape Architecture 当代北京园林发展史 (Beijing: Beijing Municipal Bureau of Parks, 1987), p. 224. 53. The orchards included 571 mu (c. 38 hectares) vineyards, 1280 mu (c. 85 hectares) apple, 529 mu (c. 35 hectares) pear, 185 mu (c. 12 hectares) peach, and 100 mu (c. 7 hectares) apricot. See: Beijing Municipal Bureau of Parks 北京市园林局, Annual Report of Beijing Landscape Architecture (1961–1962) 北京市园林绿化工作年报 (1961–1962) (Beijing: Beijing Municipal Bureau of Parks, 1963), p. 1. 54. Sun Boxun 孙伯勋, 'Management of the vineyards of Dongzhi Road in 1961' 东直路 1961 年葡萄管理情况介绍, in Beijing Municipal Bureau of Parks 北京市园林局, Annual Report of Beijing Landscape Architecture (1961–1962) 北京市园林绿化工作年报 (1961–1962) (Beijing: Beijing Municipal Bureau of Parks, 1963), pp. 114–115. 55. The Chinese text is '以农业为基础,大办粮食'. See Beijing Municipal Bureau of Parks 北京市园林局, Annual Report of Beijing Landscape Architecture (1960) 北京市园林绿化工作年报 (1960) (Beijing: Beijing Municipal Bureau of Parks, 1961), p. 4. 56. Editorial Board of Joyous Pavilion Park Records 陶然亭公园志编纂委员会, Joyous Pavilion Park Records 陶然亭公园志 (Beijing: China Forestry Press, 1999), p. 31. 57. The 'ten-side land' means the small plots of lands by the side of fields, trenches, roads, channels, graves, houses, walls, woods, barren banks, and ponds. The Chinese text is '地边、渠边、道边、沟边、坟边、房边、墙边、树林边、荒滩边、水坑边'. 58. Editorial Board of Historical Records of the Construction of Beijing 北京建设史书编辑委员会, The Construction of Beijing from the Founding of the People's Republic of China 建国以来的北京城市建设. Restricted publication (1986), p. 353. 59. Editorial Board of Joyous Pavilion Park Records 陶然亭公园志编纂委员会, Joyous Pavilion Park Records 陶然亭公园志 (Beijing: China Forestry Press, 1999), p. 31. 60. Quoted from Hangzhou Park Management Bureau 杭州市园林管理局. 'It is good to combine gardens with production, and the West Lake takes on a new look' 园林结合生产好,西湖风景面貌新. Architectural Journal, 1, 1976, p. 44. Author's translation. 61. The name of 'May Seventh Farm' was derived from the 'May Seventh' rural cadre school, which was first established on 7 May 1968 for officials and 'brain workers' to regularly participate in productive labour as a process of 'ideological revolutionization'. 62. 'A brief history of the construction of Zhongshan Park, Shantou' 汕头中山公园建设史略, available at http://stcg.shantou.gov.cn/stgk4-b.htm. Accessed 22 December 2006. 63. Among the misappropriations, an area of 5028 square metres was occupied by the Real Estate Management Bureau of Xuanwu District in 1966 for establishing a residential area; 218 square metres by Beijing Qianxiang Leather Shoes Factory in April 1967; and 900 square metres by Beijing Tannery in April 1970. See Editorial Board of Joyous Pavilion Park Records 陶然亭公园志编纂委员会, Joyous Pavilion Park Records 陶然亭公园志 (Beijing: China Forestry Press, 1999), pp. 34–35. 64. Editorial Board of Shanghai Landscape Architecture Records 《上海园林志》编纂委员会, Shanghai Landscape Architecture Records上海园林志 (Shanghai: Shanghai Academy of Social Sciences Press, 2000), p. 377. 65. Lin Xiaoxia 林晓侠, 'Why are factories built in parks?' 工厂为什么办到公园里去了?People's Daily (9 June 1978). 66. It turned out as a result of Western influences from the mid-nineteenth century. For example, in view of the contemporary defeat by Western imperialist powers, Zeng Guofan (1811–1872), one of the initiators of the Westernization Movement (1861–1894), once recorded that 'each committee member examines in detail the machine illustrations, and with the laws of point, line, plane and volume, pursue the functionality of square, circle, the horizontal and the vertical' (各委员详考图说,以点线面体之法,求方圆平直之用), in order to produce vessel and cannon fighting against imperialists. See: Zeng Guofan, The Complete Works of Zeng Guofan 曾文正公全集 (Taibei: Taiwan Eastern Bookstore, 1964). 67. Liu Shanghua 柳尚华, Fifty Years of Chinese Landscape Architecture: 1949–1999 中国风景园林当代五十年:1949–1999 (Beijing: China Architecture and Building Press, 1999), p. 23. 68. Leonid Borisovich Lunts, Greening Construction 绿化建设, trans. Zhu Junzhen 朱钧珍, Liu Chengxian 刘承娴, Ma Shiwei 马士伟, and Shen Dalun 沈大纶 (Beijing: Architectural Engineering Press, 1956), p. 222. These guidelines were consistently followed in the only Chinese handbook on residential greening, published in the late 1950s. See: Research Unit of Regional and City Planning of Architectural Science Research Institute 建筑科学研究院区域规划与城市规划研究室. Neighbourhood Greening 街坊绿化 (Beijing: Architectural Engineering Press, 1959), p. 7. 69. Quoted from Liu Shanghua 柳尚华, Fifty Years of Chinese Landscape Architecture: 1949–1999 中国风景园林当代五十年:1949–1999 (Beijing: China Architecture and Building Press, 1999), pp. 4, 19. Author's translation. 70. Interview with Professor Lü Junhua of Tsinghua University, 17 January 2005. 71. Chen Youmin 陈有民. 'Celebrating the fiftieth anniversary of the establishment of garden making group (gardening discipline)' 纪念造园组(园林专业)创建五十周年. Chinese Landscape Architecture, 1, 2002, pp, 4–5. Leningrad Forestry Academy is now St Petersburg State Forest-Technical Academy. 72. The Chinese text is '普遍绿化,重点提高'. Beijing Municipal Bureau of Parks 北京市园林局. A Collection of Working Experiences in Beijing Landscape Architecture (1949–1959) 北京市园林工作经验汇编 (1949–1959) (Beijing: Beijing Municipal Bureau of Parks, 1960), p. 5. 73. The Chinese text is '先绿化,后美化'. Beijing Municipal Bureau of Parks 北京市园林局. A Collection of Working Experiences in Beijing Landscape Architecture (1949–1959) 北京市园林工作经验汇编 (1949–1959) (Beijing: Beijing Municipal Bureau of Parks, 1960), p. 87. 74. Research Unit of Regional and City Planning of Architectural Science Research Institute 建筑科学研究院区域规划与城市规划研究室, Neighbourhood Greening 街坊绿化 (Beijing: Architectural Engineering Press, 1959), p. 9. 75. Editorial Board of Shanghai Housing Construction Records 《上海住宅建设志》编纂委员会, Shanghai Housing Construction Records 上海住宅建设志 (Shanghai: Shanghai Academy of Social Sciences Press, 1998), p. 280. 76. Other street names included Chinese Flowering Crab-apple Riverside Road (棠浦路), Plum Hill Road (梅岭路), Maple Bridge Road (枫桥路), Flower Brook Road (花溪路), Orchid Brook Road (兰溪路), Plum River Road (梅川路), Jujube Spring Road (枣阳路), and Apricot Hill Road (杏山路). It was common that limited provision of trees resulted in a lack of planting diversity at the time. As a result, this naming approach was so important for the envisioned comprehensiveness that some people in Beijing complained for such scarcity that, 'There was no road with a name associated with trees, such as Bodhi Avenue'. See: Liu Zhonghua 刘仲华, 'Oppose Right deviation, go all out, achieve greater, faster, better and more economical results in making green the capital' 反右倾,鼓干劲,多快好省绿化首都, in Beijing Municipal Bureau of Parks 北京市园林局. A Collection of the Working Experiences in Beijing Landscape Architecture (1949–1959) 北京市园林工作经验汇编 (1949–1959) (Beijing: Beijing Municipal Bureau of Parks, 1960), p. 1. 77. Editorial Board of Shanghai Housing Construction Records 《上海住宅建设志》编纂委员会, Shanghai Housing Construction Records 上海住宅建设志 (Shanghai: Shanghai Academy of Social Sciences Press, 1998), p. 279. 78. Beijing Municipal Bureau of Parks 北京市园林局, A Collection of Working Experiences in Beijing Landscape Architecture (1949–1959) 北京市园林工作经验汇编 (1949–1959) (Beijing: Beijing Municipal Bureau of Parks, 1960), p. 211. 79. This could be read in the figure of increment of numbers of Chinese public parks in: Li Min 李敏, Modern Parks in China: Development and Evaluation 中国现代公园-发展与评价 (Beijing: Beijing Science and Technology Press, 1987), p. 22. 80. Su Zemin 苏则民, 'Investigations into the experience in Tiananmen Square's reconstruction and planning' 天安门广场改建和规划的经验探讨 (unpublished Master of Architecture Thesis, School of Architecture, Tsinghua University, 1965), p. 1. 81. Imperialism, feudalism and capitalism were claimed as the 'Three Big Mountains', which weighed on the backs of the Chinese people in the 'old society' before the 1949 Liberation. 82. Wu Liangyong 吴良镛, 'The design achievements of the Monument to the People's Heroes' 人民英雄纪念碑的创作成就. Architectural Journal, 2, 1978, p. 4; Dong Guangqi 董光器, 'Some records of Tiananmen Square' 天安门广场纪事, in Fifty Years' Retrospection: Urban Planning of the New China 五十年回眸-新中国的城市规划, Urban Planning Society of China, ed. (Beijing: The Commercial Press, 1999), p. 514. 83. In the speech delivered by Premier Zhou Enlai in the founding ceremony of the Monument to the People's Heroes on 30 September 1949. See: Wu Liangyong 吴良镛, 'The planning and design of Tiananmen Square' 天安门广场的规划和设计. Collected Essays in Architectural History, 2, 1979, p. 19. 84. Li Jiale 李嘉乐, 'The greening of Tiananmen Square' 天安门广场的绿化, in Beijing Municipal Bureau of Parks 北京市园林局. A Collection of the Working Experiences in Beijing Landscape Architecture (1949–1959) 北京市园林工作经验汇编 (1949–1959) (Beijing: Beijing Municipal Bureau of Parks, 1960), p. 21. 85. Wu Liangyong 吴良镛, 'The Planning and Design of the Tiananmen Square' 天安门广场的规划和设计. Collected Essays on Architectural History, 2, 1979, p. 31. 86. Fan Yaobang 范耀邦, 'Suggestions for reasonable density of residential areas' 关于居住区合理密度的几点意见. Architectural Journal, 3, 1980, p. 22. 87. Beijing Municipal Bureau of Parks 北京市园林局, 'Greening for Chairman Mao's mausoleum' 毛主席纪念堂的绿化工程. Building Technology, Z1, 1978, p. 113. 88. Quoted from Red Flag of Faculty of South China College of Technology 华南工学院教工红旗 ed. A Collection of Criticisms of the Crimes of Tao Zhu in the Architectural Profession 陶铸在建筑领域的罪行批判集 (Guangzhou: South China College of Technology, 1967), p. 2. Author's translation. 89. Beijing Municipal Bureau of Parks 北京市园林局, A History of Beijing Modern Landscape Architecture 当代北京园林发展史 (Beijing: Beijing Municipal Bureau of Parks, 1987), p. 44. 90. This was announced in the Member of the Standing Committee of the Fifth National People's Congress. 91. Liu Shanghua 柳尚华, Fifty Years of Chinese Landscape Architecture: 1949–1999 中国风景园林当代五十年:1949–1999 (Beijing: China Architecture and Building Press, 1999), p. 72. 92. 'Every one should plant three to five trees annually' 每人每年种三至五棵树. People's Daily (16 December 1981). 93. Interview with Professor Wang Shaozeng, 20 November 2010.

The Developing EconomiesVolume 9, Issue 4 p. 400-421 Free Access CHINA'S FOREIGN POLICY SINCE THE CULTURAL REVOLUTION —Steps toward the Recovery of Its U.N. Seat— Takayuki IZUMI, Takayuki IZUMISearch for more papers by this author Takayuki IZUMI, Takayuki IZUMISearch for more papers by this author First published: December 1971 https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1746-1049.1971.tb00682.xAboutPDF ToolsRequest permissionExport citationAdd to favoritesTrack citation ShareShare Give accessShare full text accessShare full-text accessPlease review our Terms and Conditions of Use and check box below to share full-text version of article.I have read and accept the Wiley Online Library Terms and Conditions of UseShareable LinkUse the link below to share a full-text version of this article with your friends and colleagues. Learn more.Copy URL Share a linkShare onFacebookTwitterLinkedInRedditWechat REFERENCES 1 Advance Victoriously along Chairman Mao's Revolutionary Line” (NCNA, December 31, 1970), (NCNA, December 31, 1970), No. 4814 (January 7, 1971). 2 Announcement: Nixon Accepts Chou Invitation to Visit PRC” (NCNA, July 16, 1971), (NCNA, July 16, 1971), No. 137 (July 16, 1971). 3 Chou En-lai. Speech at Rumanian Ambassador's National Day Reception,” Survey of China Mainland Press, No. 4247 (August 29, 1968). 4 Flow of History Cannot Be Reversed” (Rodong shinmun editorial on August 8, 1971), Daily Report: Asia & Pacific, Vol. 4, No. 153 (August 9, 1971). 5 Indochinese Peoples Summit Conference Convened” (Viet Nam News Agency, April 27, 1970), Daily Report: Asia & Pacific, Vol. 2, No. 81 (April 27, 1970). 6 Joint Communique of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China and the Government of the People's Republic of China, and the Central Committee of the Viet Nam Workers' Party and the Government of the Democratic Republic of Viet Nam” (NCNA, March 10, 1971), Daily Report: Asia & Pacific, Vol. 4, No. 47 (March 10, 1971). 7 Joint Communique of the Government of the People's Republic of China and the Government of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea” (NCNA, April 8, 1970), Daily Report: Asia & Pacific, Vol. 2, No. 69 (April 9, 1970). 8 Joint Editorial Hails Anniversary of Mao's ‘20 May’ Statement,” Daily Report: Communist China, Vol. 1, No. 98 (May 20, 1971). 9 Lin Piao. Report to the 9th National Congress of the Communist Party of China,” Survey of China Mainland Press, No. 4406 (May 1, 1969). 10 Mao Tse-tung. On the Chungking Negotiations,” in Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung, Vol. 4 ( Peking : Foreign Languages Press, 1961). 11 Mao Tse-tung. People of the World, Unite and Defeat the U.S. Aggressors and All Their Running Dogs Peking Review, Vol. 13, Special Issue (May 23, 1970). 12 Ministry Issues Statement on CPR-U.S. Talks” (NCNA, November 26, 1968), Daily Report: Communist China, Vol. 1, No. 231 (November 26, 1968). 13 Rodong Shinmun Attacks Revived Japanese Militarism,” Daily Report: Asia & Pacific, Vol. 2, No. 64 (April 2, 1970). 14 Sihanouk, S. N. Message to Her Majesty the Queen, the Khmer Bonzes, and People” (NCNA, March 23, 1970), Daily Report: Asia & Pacific, Vol. 2, No. 57 (March 24, 1970). 15 Sihanouk, S. N. Twenty-fourth Message to the Khmer Nation on July], July 31, 1971), Daily Report: Asia & Pacific, Vol. 4, No. 148 (August 2, 1971). 16 Snow, E. A Conversation with Mao Tse-tung,” Life, April 30, 1971). 17 Statement of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China and the Government of the People's Republic of China” (NCNA, December 13, 1970), Daily Report: Communist China, Vol. 1, No. 241 (December 14, 1970). 18 Statement of the Government of the People's Republic of China” (NCNA, February 2, 1971), Daily Report: Communist China, Vol. 1, No. 31 (February 16, 1971). 19 Statement of the People's Republic of China” (NCNA, October 29, 1971), (NCNA, October 29, 1971), No. 210 (November 1, 1971). 20 Troop Withdrawal, Not Talks, Key to Indochina Solution” (NCNA, August 3, 1971), Daily Report: People's Republic of China, Vol. 1, No. 149 (August 3, 1971). Volume9, Issue4December 1971Pages 400-421 ReferencesRelatedInformation

This is the personal account of a man who grew up in China and witnessed tumultuous years of the Cultural Revolution. Born in Nanjing in 1958, Zhu Xiao Di was the son of idealistic, educated parents. His father and uncles joined the Communist movement in the 1930s during the Japanese occupation and were influential underground and military leaders throughout the revolution. Despite their honorable history, they fell into political disfavor by the time of the Cultural Revolution. In 1968, when Zhu was just ten years old, his mother and father were taken to different labor camps for rehabilitation. In the face of this injustice, the Zhus struggled to maintain family ties and uphold traditional values. Eventually, the family was reunited and restored to some measure of prominence, and a monument was later erected in Nanjing in honor of Zhu's father, Zhu Qiluan. At the heart of this narrative are the trials of a family caught in the crosscurrents of history - from the early attractions of the Communist revolution to the national disaster that followed and the subsequent odyssey of recovery.

The number of Mainland Chinese legally entering the United States has been soaring since 1978. Although a large number of them came as students and visiting scholars, many have acquired citizenship or status as resident aliens. In 1997 alone 41,100 Mainland Chinese entered the United States as legal immigrants (Statistical 11) and 46,958 as students (Digest 472). This growing community has found almost no voice in its newly adopted country other than through the publication of personal narratives of China's political upheavals. Nien Cheng's sensational 1986 autobiography Life and Death in Shanghai marked the beginning. It was followed by Liu Binyan's A Higher Kind of Loyalty (1990), Jung Chang's Wild Swans (1991),' Anchee Min's Red Azalea (1994), and more. This body of literature by immigrants from the People's Republic of China represents a new and distinctive form of writing by Chinese writers in the English-speaking world, one which bears an especially heavy burden of social responsibility because of its critical potential. Except for Nien Cheng, whose identity and ideological make-up are rooted in the pre-communist era, the other three writers have been reared in socialist China, with Liu Binyan being a communist himself, Jung Chang a daughter of elite communist cadres, and Anchee Min belonging to the generation of young radicals, the Red Guards. In spite of the adversities they braved during the AntiRightist Movement (1957) and the Cultural Revolution (1966-76), they have preserved their Marxian and socialist outlooks. As they endure blatant exploitation at their work places in the United States, many Mainland Chinese immigrants have become genuinely interested in the thought of Karl Marx, which most of them previously had studied involuntarily. Also it is their Marxist and socialist education that arouses in them rage over the effects upon

Reviewed by: Zhou Enlai: The Enigma Behind Chairman Mao by Michael Dillon Yafeng Xia (bio) Michael Dillon. Zhou Enlai: The Enigma Behind Chairman Mao. London and New York: I. B. Tauris, 2020. xi, 302 pp. Paperback $29.95, isbn 978-178-831-930-0. Among several books in English on the late Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai (who served from 1949 to 1976), two stand out. The first, by Barbara Barnouin and Yu Changgen, “explores the nature of” Zhou’s political behavior and assesses how such behavior affected twentieth-century Chinese history.1 The second, by former senior Chinese Communist Party (CCP) historian Gao Wenqian, which is based on classified party documents and personal interviews with high-level party officials, provides a revisionist account of Zhou Enlai. This volume is an abridged English translation of Gao’s Wannian Zhou Enlai (Zhou Enlai’s Later Years), which, having been adapted for Western readers, includes the stories of Zhou’s earlier years prior to the Cultural Revolution (1966–1976) and elaborates the political context of the Cultural Revolution and the behavior of other actors (chapters 2–7, pp. 21–104).2 Relying primarily on Chinese sources supplemented with writings by Western journalists who visited CCP bases during the War of Resistance against Japan and foreign diplomats stationed in Beijing in the 1950s and the 1960s, Michael Dillon presents a sympathetic account of Zhou’s life from his birth in 1898 to his death in 1976 in twenty-three chapters. This is a standard biography of Zhou, covering his childhood, education, upbringing, personality, political activism, and revolutionary activities, presenting a thorough picture of Zhou the diplomat and statesman. Dillon argues, “This private side of Zhou Enlai is one [End Page 263] of the reasons why he became the world’s favorite Chinese Communist, but Zhou’s character was complex” (p. viii). According to Dillon, Zhou “was a statesman rather than simply a political operator and achieved much on the international stage” (p. ix). But scholars on Zhou Enlai and the history of the CCP will not be pleased, as the book does not add much to what they have already known about Zhou. To correctly understand and evaluate Zhou’s historical role in the Chinese Communist movement and the People’s Republic of China (PRC), it is crucial that we correctly understand Zhou’s relationship with Mao Zedong, the CCP Chairman and China’s paramount leader from 1949 to 1976. The reviewer cannot agree with several of Dillon’s major assertions, such as, “Zhou had remained personally close to Mao, never criticized him in public, and was himself never criticized openly :: : . Eventually he was attacked, viciously but covertly, by Mao’s wife, Jiang Qing” (p. 264). I feel that the author is unfamiliar with some of the new findings on Zhou Enlai that have been revealed in the last two decades. In the following paragraphs, I try to set the record straight. The relationship between Zhou Enlai and Mao Zedong has attracted much scholarly attention, and it is a key issue in our understanding of Chinese politics in the late 1960s and early 1970s. There are three popular models of the relationship: Zhou was a faithful follower of Mao; Zhou was a puppet of Mao; and Zhou was a moderating force on Mao, which is the version the official Chinese Communist historiography promotes.3 Dillon falls into the third model, as he writes, “During the Great Leap and particularly the Cultural Revolution, Zhou was in an impossible position. To survive, he said and did things he would have preferred not to. By surviving, he ensured a degree of damage limitation and protected many friends and colleagues” (p. 270). For years, Zhou was “the Beloved People’s Premier,” a sensitive and effective administrator and a moderating force in the PRC’s politics. He was good-looking, urbane, brilliant, and a master diplomat. He always valued the nation’s needs above his own. He managed to save hundreds of purged officials during the Cultural Revolution. But Gao Wenqian turns the tables on Zhou. According to Gao, Zhou was a tragic backroom schemer, a puppet of his master Mao, and a man who so rigorously observed a...

The Red Guard student groups were at the heart of the Cultural Revolution. Mao paraded them in Tiananmen Square and they roamed with virtual impunity around the country in 1966 and 1967. On the one hand, the Red Guards were utterly idealistic in their desire to serve and follow Chairman Mao. On the other hand, this radical idealism gave vent to the petty resentments of students and frequently led to violent deaths. Rae Yang’s recent memoir of her life as a Red Guard demonstrates both results. At first she found the Cultural Revolution thrilling. She created dazibao, or “big character posters” — big sheets of paper denouncing anyone or anything the Red Guards considered “counterrevolutionary.” Her targets, however, were merely high school teachers she didn’t like, not the national political figures criticized by Mao. She was transfixed when she caught a glimpse of Chairman Mao at Tiananmen Square. Later, when her Red Guard troop traveled to Guangzhou to “make revolution,” they ended up beating a deranged man to death. What began with pure ideals ended with sordid death. The question to consider here is, How much of the complex ideas in Mao’s writings did Rae Yang and her fellow Red Guards understand?

Reviewed by: Yang Tian Chang Xiao: Yige Dan Jian Shiyi Nian De Hongweibing Yuzhong Yutianlu (Outcry from a Red Guard Imprisoned during the Cultural Revolution) Jing Li (bio) Lu Li'an . Yang Tian Chang Xiao: Yige Dan Jian Shiyi Nian De Hongweibing Yuzhong Yutianlu (Outcry from a Red Guard Imprisoned during the Cultural Revolution). Edited by Wang Shaoguang. Hong Kong: Chinese University Press, 2005. 630 pp. $23.00, ISBN 962–996–250–0. Hubei is a province with a strong rebellious spirit. The revolution of 1911 first broke out here, in the provincial capital Wuhan. From the late 1920s through the 1940s, as Chinese communists fought their way to power in China, a large number of Hubei natives joined the movement—of the 1,054 People's Liberation Army officers who in 1955 were conferred the rank of brigadier general and above, 234 came from Hubei Province. In the Cultural Revolution, Wuhan was the scene of the only large-scale open defiance of Chairman Mao. In the July Twentieth Incident of 1967, armed soldiers and workers unhappy with Mao's policies staged major demonstrations in the streets of Wuhan and stormed the guesthouse where Mao was staying, forcing the chairman into humiliating flight. For their complicity in what amounted to a mutiny, top brass in the Wuhan Regional Military Command, among them Commander Chen Zaidao, were discharged and disciplined. Lu Li'an, the author of the book under review, was also a rebel in Wuhan when the Cultural Revolution began, but a rebel of a very different kind. His rebellion targeted officials and generals such as Chen Zaidao. Lu, like Chen, was condemned and punished. In Lu's case, punishment came in the form of imprisonment from 1968 to 1979. Since the end of the Cultural Revolution, officials such as Commander Chen Zaidao have been able to write about their woes in the "ten years of chaos" (Chen's memoir came out in 1988). Red Guards like Lu, however, have been denied the status of victims and have been forbidden by the Chinese government to relate publicly their experiences. (In the postscript to his memoir, Lu lamented that his book could not make its appearance in mainland China; it was published in Hong Kong, by the Chinese University Press.) Rebellions in the Cultural Revolution had very different meanings and very different consequences, which point to the complexity of the momentous historical event that has both inspired and aggrieved so many Chinese. To carry this reflection a little further: one of the two prefaces to Lu's book is authored by Jiang Hong, a retired professor who, for his criticism of the Chinese government in 1957, was denounced and labeled a Rightist. One generally expects Chinese like Jiang Hong, with liberal tendencies, to be hostile toward the Cultural Revolution. Yet, in Jiang we find someone who was excited about the beginning of the Cultural Revolution, and who, even today, admires a Red Guard like Lu. As Jiang recalls it, back in 1966 and 1967, Lu's "idealism, his oratorical talent, and his courage appealed to many Rightists. My Rightist friends and I often talked about him in private, praising him, because in him we see ourselves in the old days" (p. xv). [End Page 510] Such experience spotlights something that China's official historiography on the Cultural Revolution has so far largely refused to acknowledge, that is, the Cultural Revolution was a phenomenon more complex than the official verdict "ten years of chaos" (shinian dongluan) can fully convey. At least in the early stage of the Cultural Revolution, many "little people," among them Chinese who had undesirable class backgrounds and who had suffered persecution in the past, harbored hopes that the new movement would address their grievances. This has not been fully recognized in China because Chinese leaders and officials who suffered at the hands of Red Guards have dominated the shaping of the official perspective on the Cultural Revolution, and they have been unwilling to give former Red Guards opportunities, and the pleasure, to justify or explain away the atrocities committed in the Cultural Revolution. While the above-mentioned concern is certainly legitimate, one should remember that only through the...

Jiang Menglin, President of Peking University during the May Fourth Movement in 1919, describes in his autobiography West Wave how life in the villages of old China remained unchanged as the political scene was changing drastically. hundreds of he wrote, matter how dynasties changed, no matter at time of peace or war, the morals, beliefs, and customs in the Chinese villages remained the same. (1) This statement reflects how little political upheavals in the history of China affected the thinking and way of life of the common people who lived in farming villages all over the country. For thousands of years, throughout the history of China, most political upheavals have been limited to high officials and aristocrats of court. There might be changes of regimes or dynasties, but the Chinese peasants, who comprise the vast majority of citizens of the country, live calmly in the same manner as in past generations, unaffected by court politics. In 1966, Mao Zedong initiated the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution Movement (1966-1976), commonly known as the Cultural Revolution, on a nationwide scale. It involved all common citizens of China in political fights and chaos, deeply influencing the mindset of the entire Chinese people as never before in the history of China. Officially launched in 1966 and lasting until 1976, with an intense period between 1966 and 1969, the Cultural Revolution of China was a political power struggle aroused and directed by Mao in order to unseat his political rivals, then powerful people of the Communist Party of China, including Liu Shaoqi, Deng Xiaoping, and their followers. (2) This movement as never before triggered political humiliation, persecution, torture, and murder all over the country among people on all levels of society, friends, neighbors, co-workers, schoolmates, teachers, and even family members. It is regarded as the worst manmade disaster in modern Chinese history. Cultural Revolution as Motivated by Rhetoric Shaorong Haung, in his book To Rebel Is Justified, pointed out: The Cultural Revolution Movement in China was a revolution, a social upheaval, a political drama, and above all, a rhetorical (3) In Haung's opinion, rhetoric has tremendous power and influence on its audience in any movement. Haung cited Leland M. Griffin's theory to explain that men as beings moved and were moved through speech, the rhetorical power of the word, and the persuasive power of language. (4) Judged from this aspect, the Cultural Revolution of China was truly motivated, sustained, and completed using rhetorical propaganda. However, all sorts of persecuting and violent activities of the movement were performed on the basis of the teachings of Mao Zedong, which were mostly written in the Dialogue of Mao Zedong (the Little Red Book), accompanied by political slogans, propaganda posters, revolutionary dances, and songs. rhetoric of the movement, Mao's teachings, was presented and promoted most often in the form of paintings, dances, and songs at the gatherings of the masses. arts were thus highlighted to such an extent that they became the integral and essential part of the Cultural Revolution. During the ten years of the Cultural Revolution, with school systems in China mostly paralyzed and non-functioning, teenagers from all over the country were organized by Mao and his followers to become Red Guards. Their function was to persecute followers of Mao's political rivals. On August 8, 1968, one million Red Guards gathered at Tiananmen Square in Beijing to pay tribute and claim loyalty to Mao Zedong. (5) For ten years, especially between 1966 and 1969, countless political fights occurred all over the country among groups of people belonging to opposing political backgrounds. (6) These fights usually took place in the form of public gatherings, where individuals or groups were accused of being anti-revolutionary and then persecuted by the Red Guards. …

“In my entire life I did not produce a single painting that was uppermost in mind to create,” the celebrated painter Dong Xiwen (1914–1973) reportedly lamented on his deathbed. Dong may not have produced the dream piece that he would truly cherish, but he did create, albeit unwillingly, a deeply controversial work of art in his 1953 oil painting The Founding Ceremony of the Nation (Kaiguo dadian) (Figures 1 and 2), for it epitomizes the tension between art and politics in the People's Republic of China (PRC). In this famous piece, Dong portrays Chairman Mao Zedong (1893–1976) in Tiananmen Square on 1 October 1949, with his senior associates in attendance—Liu Shaoqi (1898–1969), Zhu De (1886–1976), Zhou Enlai (1898–1976), Gao Gang (1905–1954), Lin Boqu (1886–1960), and others. They are surrounded by huge lanterns, a Chinese symbol of prosperity, and a sea of red banners that declare the founding of a new nation. When first unveiled in 1953, the painting was widely hailed as one of the greatest oil paintings ever produced by a native artist. In just three months more than half-a-million reproductions of the painting were sold. But the fate of this work soon took an ominous turn, and the artist was requested to make three major revisions during his lifetime. In 1954 Dong was instructed to excise Gao Gang from the scene when Gao was purged by the Party for allegedly plotting to seize power and create an “independent kingdom” in Manchuria. During the Cultural Revolution in the mid-1960s Liu Shaoqi was accused of advocating a “bourgeois reactionary line” and subsequently was purged, and Dong was ordered in 1967 to redo his painting again and erased Liu from the inauguration scene. Then, in 1972, also during the Cultural Revolution, the radicals, commonly labeled the “Gang of Four,” ordered a third revision, namely, that Lin Boqu be eliminated from the painting for allegedly opposing the marriage of Mao and Jiang Qing (1914–1991) during the Yan'an days. By this time Dong was dying of cancer and was too ill to pick up the brush, so his student Jin Shangyi (b. 1934), and another artist, Zhao Yu (1926–1980), were assigned the task. These two artists, afraid of doing further damage to the original piece, eventually produced a replica of the painting, with the ailing Dong brought from the hospital for consultation on his embattled work. Though Dong died the following year, the ill-fated story of The Founding Ceremony of the Nation did not end: in 1979, with the demise of the Gang of Four and the Party's official rehabilitation of Liu Shaoqi, the images of Liu, Gao Gang, and Lin Boqu were restored in the painting. Because Jin Shangyi was on a foreign tour, Yan Zhenduo (b. 1940), a graduate of the Department of Oil Painting at the Central Academy of Fine Arts (CAFA), was called upon to help reinstall the three leaders.

Reviewed by: Remaking Beijing: Tiananmen Square and the Creation of a Political Space Shana J. Brown (bio) Wu Hung . Remaking Beijing: Tiananmen Square and the Creation of a Political Space. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2005; co-published with Reaktion Books. 272 pp. Hardcover $80.00, ISBN 02-2636078-4. Paperback $35.00, ISBN 02-2636079-2. Tiananmen, the gate of heavenly peace, is featured on the official emblem of the People's Republic of China; from its balcony Mao Zedong proclaimed the establishment of the new state in 1949. His portrait hanging there was defaced by activists forty years later, but still stared down the student-built Goddess of Democracy. To the north are the palaces of the Forbidden City; to the south is Tiananmen Square, the vast granite-paved heart of Beijing and its principal site of pomp and protest. Mao is entombed on its southern end, flanked by the Great Hall of the People and the Museum of Chinese History, with the navel-like Monument to the People's Heroes directly in-between. Art historian Wu Hung grew up in Beijing and experienced Tiananmen Square from numerous emotional vantage points: as a young child marching in National Day parades, living in the Forbidden City as an employee of the Palace Museum, and slipping out through the gate to join the mourners for Zhou Enlai in 1976. Now on the faculty at the University of Chicago, the author offers us this multilayered work, at once a history of the square's construction and political importance, a reflection of the square's "centrality" to contemporary Chinese art, and a memoir of his own experiences growing up in Beijing, being persecuted during the Cultural Revolution, and beginning his academic career on the square's fringes. The square and the mammoth state buildings that surround it testify to the value placed on enormous, rectilinear spaces by the PRC's leadership. They like grandeur and impersonality-save for Mao's enormous alter-egos, his portrait over Tiananmen gate, and, later, his entombed body on the square's southern edge. A series of stamps issued in 1949 displayed Mao's head and torso looming [End Page 289] above Tiananmen, so closely were the two monuments paired from the beginning of the regime. In fact, the historical city already featured a walled-in square in front of Tiananmen, but after 1949 it was deemed inadequate. So immediately after the founding of the Republic, the square and adjacent Chang'an Avenue were enlarged, the latter from fifteen meters wide in 1949 to eighty meters ten years later. The square, meanwhile, was eventually increased to some fifty acres, a space that can hold over half a million people. Construction required the demolition of numerous old roads, buildings, and monuments. The square's location just south of the Imperial Palace centered the space appropriately-the empty expanse became a political "zero point" from which the rest of the city radiated. Around and within this space a number of structures were added, beginning with the Monument to the People's Heroes, completed in 1958. The monument, covered with a series of bas-relief panels that depict famous uprisings and movements in the revolution, shows not a single recognizable historical figure; instead, all the heroes, male and female, share the same smooth, determined, impersonal mask. On the monument is inscribed, in Mao's calligraphy, a series of epigraphs praising the martyrs to China's long revolution. Above Tiananmen Gate itself, meanwhile, Mao's portrait was hoisted (replacing earlier images of Sun Yat-sen and Chiang Kai-shek). At least five different images have been used over the decades, some showing the leader gazing far above the crowd, some smiling, some emotionless. The most long-lasting images show the leader facing the square directly; "Mao's gaze acknowledges a 'revolutionary people' before him, even when he faces only an empty Tiananmen Square" (p. 78). With Mao's portrait opposite his own calligraphy on the monument to the south, the space is bounded north and south by his political will: "When he stood above Tiananmen he faced his own words in his own calligraphy, and when he was not there his...

The Chinese have claimed that their educational system, like their whole way of life, remains in a state of change and experiment, as the Cultural Revolution has demonstrated. Yet the University of Toronto's tour of the People's Republic of China throughout June 1972 found that several new and firm principles of education were becoming established there. During the Cultural Revolution, begun in 1966, regular classes stopped. Workers' propaganda teams for spreading Mao Tse-Tung's thoughts were stationed in the colleges, and students travelled all over the country to share in criticism and debate and to exchange revolutionary experiences. Undergraduate classes finally resumed at the universities in the autumn of 1970, but as late as 1972 graduate programs had not recommenced, though hopefully would reopen soon. Mao Tse-Tung, at one time himself a professional teacher and in 1920-21 president of a Hunnan normal school, once stated that the main problem of educational revolution lies with teachers, as the ideology of teachers strongly influences students. Since most of the present university faculty members graduated before the Cultural Revolution, they were sent during this revolution to cadre schools to live in the countryside in order to be reeducated by the workers, peasants, and soldiers there; and similar schools still operate throughout China. Since a cadre (gan bu in Chinese) is any government functionary engaged in mental or administrative work, this category includes all teachers from every level of education. In 1972 the student body at the cadre schools reportedly came voluntarily, mostly from positions as leading members of the basic units of their work, either chairmen or vice-chairmen of revolutionary committees. Such schools, therefore, appear to ensure that least the leaders in China become exemplars of self-reliance and selflessness. One such school, the May 7 Cadre School of the Eastern District of Peking, is a typical complex of houses and farmland built by the students themselves on what was originally barren sandfield. Here workers from the local commune not only come to lecture but also accept students as temporary residents in their nearby village so these students can learn from them firsthand. Manual labor ranks as an important factor in ideological remolding and in development of self-reliance and the spirit of hard struggle. In addition, much of the school's time is devoted to the works of Chairman Mao, Marx, Engels, and Lenin. The local revolutionary committee determines the length of one's stay at the cadre school. By means of a written self-appraisal, the student must consequently report to that committee his progress. One woman reported orally to our visiting party that she had found middle school teaching tiring

In a memoir about his experiences during the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution (GPCR) campaign, Liang Xiaosheng, a former Red Guard, describes what he calls “one of the most frantic scenes ever to occur in human history.” On November 3, 1966, he and “tens of thousands of” other Red Guards from all over the People’s Republic of China (PRC) “shouted, yelled, and cried” in Beijing’s Tiananmen Square. They rushed and crowded there to see Mao, who would “inspect” (jianyue) them from atop the Tiananmen Gate: Thousands upon thousands of Red Guards converged into a sea of people, twisting and turning in Tiananmen Square, becoming a huge maelstrom as in a deep sea. Each person was like a tiny rock, being turned and swirled in a gigantic whirlpool, neither rising nor sinking. Whichever way one should turn to face Tiananmen Gate was completely beyond one’s control, as he or she was being forced to spin around and around in the vortex.1

The Communist Chinese Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution of I966 will probably be considered in socialist history to be as mysterious or significant as the Paris Commune of I87I. The Chinese communists have called the Cultural revolution 'the Second Revolution', claiming it has made a marked and decisive step towards communism. The interpretation and assessment of the cultural revolution is by no means clear or conclusive, but one thing that stands out rather clearly is that it has captivated the enthusiasm and intellectual curiosity of students of China, Marxist and non-Marxist. The study of the Chinese cultural revolution must be approached at two analytically distinct levels: actual and symbolic. The actual level deals with the concrete, historical cultural revolution which appears as a mixture of real politik, violence and romantic sentimentalism; the symbolic level deals with the historical and cultural significance of the cultural revolution which may transcend its subjective irrationality.l This paper is mainly addressed to one of the most important aspects of the cultural revolution at the second symbolic level. One of the most significant legacies of the cultural revolution is its anti-bureaucratism. Indeed, the whole revolution can be viewed as a movement of the ruled masses against the ruling bureaucratic establishment. The cultural revolution was the product of Mao Tse-tung's ingenious use of his personal charisma in mobilizing the romantic idealism and revolutionary dynamism of the third generation, the red guards, in order to engage them in all-out war with the Liu Shao-chi-led party-state apparatuses. By the eve of the cultural revolution, Communist China had witnessed a process of bureaucratization, as anticipated by Weber in his work on socialism. Mao's intervention was a kind of charismatic breakthrough from the bureaucratic routinization. During the initial stage of cultural revolution, the party-state apparatuses were indiscriminately attacked. Party-charisma was stripped off overnight. What emerged in its place was a 'charismatic bureaucracy' in which the charismatic leader, Mao, developed a direct dialogue with his disciples, the millions of red guards. As a result, a fanatical mass activism and romantic spontaneity replaced

The Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution, which by official Chinese reckoning lasted from the beginning of 1966 to the death of Mao Zedong some ten years later, was one of the most extraordinary events of this century. The images of the Cultural Revolution remain vivid: the young Red Guards, in military uniform, filling the vast Tiananmen Square in Beijing, many weeping in rapture at the sight of their Great Helmsman standing atop the Gate of Heavenly Peace; veteran Communist officials, wearing dunce caps and placards defiling them as “monsters” and “freaks,” herded in the backs of open-bed trucks, and driven through the streets of major cities by youth only one-third their age; the wall posters, often many sheets of newsprint in size, filled with vitriolic condemnations of the “revisionist” or “counterrevolutionary” acts of senior leaders. The little red book carried by the Red Guards – a plastic-bound volume containing selected quotations from Chairman Mao – remains a symbol of the revolt of the young against adult authority. From a purely narrative perspective, the Cultural Revolution can best be understood as a tragedy, both for the individual who launched it and for the society that endured it. The movement was largely the result of the decisions of a single man, Mao Zedong. Mao's restless quest for revolutionary purity in a postrevolutionary age provided the motivation for the Cultural Revolution, his unique charismatic standing in the Chinese Communist movement gave him the resources to get it underway, and his populist faith in the value of mass mobilization lent the movement its form.

Reviewed by: 中国大陆改革开放新词语 Zhongguo dalu gaige kaifang xin ciyu (A glossary of new political terms of the People's Republic of China in the post-reform era) Jing Li (bio) Li Gucheng (Li Kwok-sing) , compiler. 中国大陆改革开放新词语 Zhongguo dalu gaige kaifang xin ciyu (A glossary of new political terms of the People's Republic of China in the post-reform era). Hong Kong: Chinese University Press, 2006. lxvii, 634 pp. $39.00, ISBN 962-996-258-6. The Chinese love set phrases. This may have something to do with their character-based language, which gravitates toward succinctness in expression. Another factor is the Chinese emphasis on conventions and tradition—once authoritative ideas are formed, they are widely shared and quickly spread in society. Thus, the use of correct terminology is particularly important in Chinese life. Confucius famously declared that, for one to speak properly, he must first "rectify names" (正名), an effort we may generalize to mean getting any significant concepts right. As China went through drastic transformation in the modern age, new terms and phrases depicting changing conditions in the country appeared in large numbers, gaining broad currency. This is the case with China under Mao, and it is the case with China in the Reform Era. For those who intend to learn about China in the past thirty years by looking at official jargon and popular lingo, Li's book is a good source. After combing through official documents, leading periodicals, as well as reference works, the author selected 1,295 Chinese expressions from the period to present, with explanations of their meanings and origins. The result is a collage that well illustrates the dynamic life of China from 1978 to 2005. One cannot miss the key phrases that mark the crucial political changes China experienced during the period. Back in the late 1970s and early 1980s, when Deng Xiaoping was just initiating his reform, any Chinese who paid attention to larger events in the country must have heard or read the declaration Shi jian shi jian yan zhen li de wei yi biao zhun—"Practice is the sole criterion to determine truth." Obscurely philosophical at first glance, the idea was a lethal weapon in the hands of Chinese reformists at the time, who used it to compel Maoist hardliners to acknowledge the terrible failure of Mao's Great Cultural Revolution. The reformers won this round of the combat, but the road ahead of them was far from smooth. In the middle of the 1980s, Deng was using the expression "One hand strong, the other weak"—Yi shou ying, yi shou ruan—to criticize Chinese officials who succeeded with economic reform but overlooked the important task of maintaining political and ideological control over the country. The conflict between the new economy and old politics was, however, too severe for Deng and the Communist Party to resolve. The quandary soon led to the turmoil that culminated in the 1989 Tiananmen Square crisis. Having barely survived the troubles of 1989, Chinese leaders continued their quest for ways to rationalize their contradictory policies, putting forward terminologies [End Page 230] that became new watchwords of the country. For General Secretary Jiang Zemin, the key concept was san ge dai biao—literally "three represents"—the idea that the Chinese Communist Party represents the productive force, progressive culture, and fundamental interests of the Chinese people. Again, the seemingly bland expression denotes a supremely critical endeavor—the legitimization of the Communist Party that now heads a largely capitalist economy, where, even by the furthest stretch of reason, the Party could no longer simply claim that it is the vanguard of the Chinese proletariat bent on the destruction of capitalism. In the same spirit, when Hu Jintao succeeded Jiang Zemin to lead the Chinese Communist Party, he offered the country catchphrases such as he xie she hui ("harmonious society") and ke xue fa zhan ("scientific development"). These ideas have one thing in common: they avoid the unpleasant dissection of Chinese society in terms of classes or interest groups and instead emphasize a common bond among all Chinese. China has certainly come a long way from the Mao era, when a popular saying was Jie ji dou zheng, yi...