Abstract

Emerging new materialism scholarship provides an exciting theoretical space not only for challenging traditional conceptions of human agency but also for rethinking the role of the material world in shaping political outcomes. Although a wildly diverse intellectual movement, this scholarship shares the common goal of widening traditional understandings of agency to include nonhuman objects. This article adopts insights from cognitive science to extend the concept of political agency beyond the confines of human intention. Instead of focusing on the constraining material characteristics of the nonhuman within a large-scale relational framework, we argue in support of a distributive understanding of agency based on the co-constitutional essence of the mind itself. Specifically, we integrate insights from embodied cognition grounded in dynamical systems theory into the established framework of the hydrosocial cycle to argue that residents’ experiences within an active material world help explain the existence of certain flood risk perceptions. In other words, human intention or agency—as it is commonly understood—comes into existence through a co-constitutional process involving brain, body, and aspects of a wider environment. Using qualitative interview data from two communities along the Yellowstone River in eastern Montana, we support our arguments through an investigation of three types of embodied experiences between residents and the levees that shape risk perception. Key Words: embodied cognition, hydrosocial cycle, new materialism, risk perception.

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