Abstract

Abstract : The term revolution in military affairs (RMA) is a buzzword inside the Beltway and among academics interested in defense affairs. As Dennis Schowalter noted at a recent conference, RMA has replaced TQM total quality management as the acronym of choice among members of the Armed Forces. One suspects that much of this enthusiasm, which rests upon only the slightest knowledge of the historical record, may distort as much as it helps in thinking about military change and innovation. Yet one must also admit that military events of late suggest major changes in technology and weapons with substantial implications for conducting war in the next century. This article suggests how one might think about RMAs of the past and the implications of the historical record for the future. The views reflect the influence, comments, and thoughts of colleagues in the historical profession. First, historians have done relatively little work on RMAs. Michael Roberts introduced the idea of a single military revolution in his inaugural lecture at Queens University Belfast in 1955. Thereafter until 1991, interest in the military revolution was focused on the 16th and 17th centuries; early modern historians argued among themselves about whether there was such a revolution and, if so, when it occurred and what form it took. That debate continues. Since the mid-l8th century, however, military historians have concentrated on other issues such as innovation, effectiveness, adaptation, organizational behavior, or-the bread and butter of the profession-battle histories. Modern historians quite simply have not been very interested in military revolutions.

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