The Revolution in Military Affairs

Abstract

Victory smiles upon those who anticipate changes in the character of war, not upon those who wait to adapt themselves after the changes occur. General Guilio DouhetTHE EMINENT MILITARY HISTORIAN, Sir Michael Howard, was once 'tempted to declare dogmatically that whatever doctrine the Armed Forces are working on now, they have got it wrong. I am also tempted to declare that it does not matter that they have got it wrong. What does matter is their capacity to get it right quickly when the moment arrives.'(f.1) His assertion is, in most respects, a reasonable and accurate description of an age-old problem. Military history is replete with examples of armed forces getting it wrong. In some cases they were able to adjust, adapt, and in the end get it right. More frequently, they were not, and suffered drastic consequences.Despite the general applicability of Howard's statement, there are examples, albeit far fewer, of armed forces 'getting it right.' Those are the cases in which armed forces carried out a systematic and rigorous study of new developments and then, by careful experimentation and selective procurement, created a model that resulted in a change in capability of such magnitude that competitors were left in their wake.(f.2) In the aftermath of the Persian Gulf War, the question facing today's armed forces is whether recent changes in technology in general, but particularly information technology, may be harbingers of another period of extensive change that could necessitate a new model for the conduct of war. The discussion in the professional military literature has raised the question of whether another revolution in military affairs (RMA), one that purports to offer militaries a new model for warfighting, is taking place. Simply put, the assertion rests on the proposition that developments in the late 20th century and potential developments in the 21 st century may alter the character of military operations. The main aspects of these developments are: 1) greater lethality and dispersion, 2) increased volume and precision of fire, 3) more efficiency and effectiveness from better integrated technology, 4) increasing ability of smaller units to create decisive results, and 5) greater invisibility and increased detectability. Taken together, it is argued, these developments will significantly change military operations in the future. No longer will high-intensity conflict necessitate sequential, linear operations. Rather, high-intensity conflict will be characterized by simultaneous, non-linear operations employing more lethal and precise strike systems from a greater range.To date, most of the discussion about an RMA, at least in the public domain, has taken place in the United States. This should come as no great surprise: the United States does not wish to relinquish its position as the sole remaining superpower. In the view of many military analysts, the RMA is one means of ensuring this position in a world marked by uncertainty. More recently, however, the idea of an RMA has begun to permeate the wider Western defence community. In Britain, France, Germany, Australia, and Canada investigations into the central tenets of the RMA, as well as its applicability and potential implications, have been, or are currently, under way.THE DEBATEThat an RMA is under way, or that we may be on the cusp of one, is not universally accepted. Quite the contrary; a vigorous and ongoing debate continues to swirl around the notion that technology can significantly alter the character of war. On the one hand, the advocates of an RMA suggest that developments in technology, coupled with doctrinal and organizational change, will fundamentally alter war in the future. On the other hand, contrarians suggest that this is a dangerous fallacy that does not pay heed to historical verities. Stripped of the rhetorical excesses that attend any such debate, the question is: have the advocates got it right? …