Abstract
The notorious problem of the many makes it difficult to resist the conclusion that almost coincident with any ordinary object (such as a cat or a coffee cup) are a vast number of near-indiscernible objects. As Unger (Midwest Stud Philos 5:411–467, 1980) was aware in his presentation of the problem, this abundance raises a concern as to how—and even whether—we achieve singular thought about ordinary objects. This paper presents, clarifies, and defends a view which reconciles a plenitudinous conception of ordinary objects with our having singular thoughts about those objects. Indeed, this strategy has independent application in the case of singular thoughts about other putatively ‘abundant’ phenomena, such as locations or lumps of matter. In essence, singular thought-vehicles need not express just one singular content. If there are many objects, one’s singular thought-vehicle may express as many thought-contents.
Published Version
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