Abstract

Most internal wars end on the battlefield. Only a small percentage end at the negotiating table. While significant attention has been paid to how internal wars begin and how they evolve, relatively little attention has been paid to how they are concluded. What research has been done on this subject, furthermore, has focused almost exclusively on the problems that stand in the way of achieving a negotiated outcome, not on how these conflicts are so frequently resolved by force. This article examines the dynamics of the endgame struggle and the quite different ways in which states and insurgencies ‘win’ and ‘lose’ internal wars. We explore this topic theoretically and empirically in the first part of the article and examine the formal logic of the endgame in the second part, explaining how and why these endings follow a predictable pattern.

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