Thescienceof cognitive science

Abstract

Maurice Bloch (2012) argues that ethnographers’ animosity toward and ignorance of cognitive science is based on a false dichotomy between ‘nature’ (as in universal human nature) and ‘culture’. Bloch characterises ethnography as evoking and describing culturally and historically specific symbolic systems that ground and enable meaningful lives. He further argues that there is no such thing as ‘super-organic meaning’. All meaning, even culturally constructed meaning, is the product of individual human minds and must be interpreted by individual minds. Cognitive science, including philosophy and linguistics as well as psychology, is the science of mental representations, and thus of the symbols individual minds create, interpret and use in practice, communication and thought. Bloch argues that ignoring the science of mental representation, at the very least, makes the work of ethnographers less nuanced and rich than it might otherwise be and, at worst, leads to theoretical commitments that are deeply counterproductive. Conversely, he argues that cognitive scientists’ refusal or inability to understand the profound lessons of the work of ethnographers from Malinowski through Boas through Evans-Pritchard through Geertz symmetrically makes their work less nuanced and rich thanitmightotherwisebeandsimilarlyleadstoavoidable,theoreticallyimportant,errors. Here I focus on the latter possibility. I respond to two of Bloch’ sw orries concerning where cognitive science has gone wrong by virtue of not properly appreciating the cultural/historical specificity of symbol systems. Although I believe these worries are groundless, I endorse Bloch’s call for rapprochement, and conclude with other reasons cognitive scientists should enlist in the more sustained collaboration Bloch advocates. Bloch’s worries: