Abstract
Yehezkel presents an interesting argument to resolve Goodman’s New Riddle of Induction, and in effect to claim that a purely syntactical theory of confirmation is possible. In this paper I suggest that Yehezkel’s argument relies on two premises not proven in his paper. The first premise is that if “a New Riddle of Deduction” can be formulated then there is no New Riddle of Induction. This premise seems to be wrong as I claim in part 2 of this paper. The second premise is that a New Riddle of Deduction can be formulated. Despite Yehezkel’s efforts to prove this claim, it seems to me false, or at least, unproven. I therefore conclude that there is no New Riddle of Deduction, and therefore, no actual resolution to the New Riddle of Induction.
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