Abstract

Israel 2004 claims that numerous philosophers have misinterpreted Goodman’s original ‘New Riddle of Induction’, and weakened it in the process, because they do not take the predicate ‘grue’ to refer to past observations. Both claims are false: Goodman very explicitly took his riddle to concern the maximally general problem of how to correctly “project” any type of characteristic from any given realm of objects into another, and this problem subsumes that of inferring from past examined cases to present and future ones.

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