Theory-Driven versus Data-Driven Assessment in a Crisis

Abstract

A survey examined theory-driven versus data-driven assessments in a crisis. Respondents were 604 subscribers to International Security who completed a mailed questionnaire. The questionnaire contained alternative versiosn of a hypothetical crisis scenario and elicited assessments of threat, deterrence contingencies, and policy responses. An earlier section of the questionnaire surveyed general beliefs about Soviet-U.S. relations and military strategy, permitting examination of the relationships of respondents' general beliefs to their assessments. Alternative versions of the hypothetical crisis differed in information describing the crisis, permitting examination of the influence of specific data on assessments. Four kinds of information were varied: Soviet motives, the balance of interests, the local conventional military balance, and the nuclear balance. Respondents were substantially more theory-driven than data-driven in assessing the hypothetical crisis. Assessments were particularly associated with beliefs about Soviet motives and the necessity of displaying resolve to deter Soviet aggression.