Abstract

Scientific theories are usually considered to represent the world around us. In this perspective it becomes a metaphysical question in what sense and how far these representations reveal the basic structures of the world as they exist independently of the human faculties. Some metaphysical realists will argue that metaphysical questions are unanswerable by science; others argue that scientific theories are exactly what enable us to explain how the reality is in itself. Either view seems to face difficulties with Carnap’s distinction between internal and external questions. The chapter discusses this issue with respect to various forms of realistic approaches to science such as theory realism, entity realism, and structural realism. As an antirepresentationalist the evolutionary naturalist discards the general conception that scientific theories can tell us something about reality from the perspective of nowhere.

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