Abstract
We present a coordination game experiment testing the robustness of the predictive power of level-k reasoning and team reasoning in a sample of Chinese tax administrators that is matched for likely socio-economic characteristics with our student sample. We show how the incidence of coordination game play is virtually identical between Chinese tax administrators and university students. However, compared to non-students, students are more attracted by the focal point when this offers equal payoffs while the other equilibria do not. Evidence from an additional experiment suggests that this could be because payoff equality promotes team reasoning more effectively among students.
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