Theories of Rationality and Principles of Charity

Abstract

While there is no consensus over how of should be formulated, there is nevertheless a general agreement that use of that principle is required in attributions of rationality. What has perhaps not been generally noted is that taking principle of charity seriously results in a conception of rationality that is at odds with conception underlying many discussions concerning rationality, especially in philosophy of science. What I would like to do here is articulate this conception. My purpose is not to produce a refutation of standard conception. Rather, it is to challenge thought that unless standard conception is correct, result is skepticism. By challenging this thought, way is open for some non-skeptical doubts. A theory of scientific rationality falls into two parts, depending upon whether we are dealing with rationality of scientific actions or of scientific beliefs. One part is concerned with various activities characteristic of science-choosing research projects, designing and conducting experiments, etc. An account of rationality here consists in providing a framework for identifying a goal or aim-sometimes gravely referred to as the aim of science--and showing that there is an appropriate connection between activity in question and goal. The other part is concerned with scientific theories. An account of rationality here consists in providing a framework for judging whether reasons for believing these theories are good reasons.' Although I will confine myself to this part of a theory of rationality, I hope it will be clear how following remarks are to be modified to apply to other part. The traditional approach to articulating a theory of rationality proceeds by formulating criteria or rules specifying conditions under which one thing is a good reason for believing something else. The standard work in confirmation theory takes its problem to be that of explicating conditions