Theoretical Reviewing Of Overlapping Consensus In The Context Of Abortion Debate

Abstract

Since the beginning of the late modern era, modern constitutions have been trying to keep both group
 rights as minority rights and individual rights. But, in some cases, it is still ambiguous if an action or a
 phenomenon must refer to individual rights or group rights. Abortion discussions, with regard to political
 rights, are one example of these ambiguous cases. In this context, whereas Liberal view tends to regard
 abortion as individual rights of a woman, Communitarian view can be against it by pointing out the right
 to life and this case may lead to a kind of liberal constitutional crises. This article gains importance as such
 constitutional crises still emerge even nowadays. John Rawls’s theory of overlapping consensus in Political
 Liberalism tries to solve these political conflicts that emerged in liberal constitutions by prioritizing public
 reason. This article conceptionally aims to examine Rawls’s theory in terms of prioritization and value
 relativity in abortion discussions. The method of article is hermeneutics. In order to extend the universe of
 the discussion, some important thinkers such as Immanuel Kant, Isaiah Berlin and John Gray, who have
 related studies on the topic, were included. In conclusion, it is asserted that Rawl’s theory is weak both
 practically and theoretically as to the principle of utilitarianism violates the rights of communitarians.