The worldly constituents of perceptual presence.

Ezequiel A Di Paolo

doi:10.3389/fpsyg.2014.00450

Abstract

The worldly constituents of perceptual presence.

Highlights

I believe Seth can take this worry into account by shifting the emphasis from the brain to the worldly constituents of perceptual presence
Seth defends a marriage of predictive perception (PP) probabilistic models and SMCs theory (SMCT)
Putting aside the question of whether this is not too strong an exception for the normal workings of hierarchical generative models (HGMs)—it may not be—why would intermediate models supersede low-level error-correcting mechanisms and so result in sustaining an impoverished repertoire of counterfactual probability distributions affecting concurrent presence in synesthetes? It would be necessary to explain why, if both content and presence are expressed in probabilistic action-sensation mappings, and if counterfactual richness could affect both, error-correcting mechanisms at the lower level manage not to rectify for aberrant presence in synesthetes

Summary

Introduction

A predictive processing theory of sensorimotor contingencies: explaining the puzzle of perceptual presence and its absence in synesthesia Seth, A. His proposal links perceptual presence with the counterfactual richness of predictive models in the brain, an appealing move, which is not without problems.

Results

Conclusion