The Who and the How of Experience

Abstract

Does consciousness require a self ?1 In what follows, I argue that it does not. I concede at the outset that this is a counterintuitive thesis. For, a central feature of conscious states is that their mode of appearance (i.e. how they are given) exhibits an irreducibly first-personal nature. My experiences are distinctly my own, given to me and only me. This first-personal ‘how’ of consciousness is what secures its phenomenal character. And it seems natural to assume that this how points back to a ‘who’: a stable, enduring, conscious subject at the receiving end of phenomenal states. But is the assumption that a how requires a who warranted? I will argue below that, just because the subjective character of consciousness gives rise to a sense of self—that is, the felt sense of being a stable who, or owner of conscious episodes—it does not follow that this who really exists in any autonomous or enduring sense. First, I do some background work, briefly discussing the phenomenological notion of the ‘minimal self ’ before then looking at a Buddhist conception of selfless subjectivity. Next, I examine the minimal self more carefully, along with what is sometimes termed the ‘narrative self ’, and argue for the experiential primacy of the former. I then argue that the phenomenal character of consciousness, which the minimal self-model is supposed to