The West’s Interest in a Peaceful Cyprus

Abstract

The crisis broke on Christmas Day, 1963, and did not subside until towards the end of the following year. Throughout this period many members of the Western alliance were anxious – severely so on occasion – about the threat presented to their interests by events in Cyprus. Most notably was this true of Britain, the ex-colonial overlord, who had retained a foothold on the island. But the United States was not far behind Britain in her concern; and many of Nato’s other members were also exercised about the matter. In consequence, they were emphatic about the need for a very early restoration of internal calm, and also clear that to keep the crisis off the boil some form of third-party intervention was required. Not all of them displayed a comparable keenness to contribute to it; indeed, there was a discernible reluctance to get involved. But that did not mean that the declaratory statements of the Western states lacked substance. The Cyprus crisis caused genuine, and sometimes acute, alarm. Only France, expressing her leader’s disdain for Anglo-Saxon states, tended to dissociate herself from this concern. And even she would without doubt have been deeply worried had the crisis got out of hand.