The Weight of Moral Reasons

Abstract

Most of us believe the following two theses: (i) we are all subject to non-trivial moral requirements; and (ii) whenever we are subject to a moral requirement, we have overriding or compelling reason for acting accordingly. But why exactly are these two theses true? This chapter explores how that question might be answered within the context of a value-based conception of reasons — according to which all reasons for action arise from the way in which the available acts count, in various ways, as good or bad things to do. It seems that only the moral reasons that ground moral requirements are overriding; supererogatory moral reasons are not overriding in the same way. It is argued here that the former moral reasons are overriding, not because they 'disable' or 'silence' all countervailing non-moral reasons, but simply because they outweigh them. It is suggested that these moral reasons outweigh those competing reasons because moral values are in a sense “big values”, liable to generate especially weighty reasons that outweigh the reasons that arise from other values.