The Washington Command Post of Intelligence: The Bureaucratic Rivalries That Influenced the National Security Act of 1947

Abstract

Historians often frame President Truman’s decisions to disband the Office of Strategic Services (OSS) and to form the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) as the consequence of strategies developed to counter foreign enemies, including fascists and communists, or involving concerns over civil liberties. Relatively few scholars, by contrast, have examined the institutional development of intelligence organizations and the roles that bureaucratic rivalries and governmental factors played in influencing Truman and the development of the postwar national security state. This paper examines interagency conflicts, policymakers’ personalities, departmental jurisdictions, and prior and institutional experiences. The primary rationale behind the creation of the OSS was to remedy the uncoordinated nature of departmental intelligence. The creation of the OSS in 1942, however, considerably worsened rivalries, and led to its termination almost immediately following the war. After months of hesitancy, Truman concluded that formalized central intelligence was the only way to address these rivalries and thus ordered the various intelligence agencies to formulate a plan for a modern, postwar intelligence structure. Making use of declassified government documents and policymakers’ correspondence and memoirs, this paper addresses the degree to which these bureaucratic rivalries and intragovernmental factors helped construct the national security state. By doing so, this paper sheds light on contemporary issues of intelligence failures, government reorganization plans, and the expanding national security apparatus.