The vita activa and the human condition: Points of clarification in reply to Jansson and Wagman

Abstract

ABSTRACT Writing about Hannah Arendt’s valuable contribution to occupational science, Jansson and Wagman (2018) offered perceptive and constructive comments on my previous paper (Turnbull, 2018). Here I seek to clarify and further develop my own interpretive position on these topics. Agreeing that further consideration of Arendt’s philosophical roots is needed, I argue that the three fundamental activities of the vita activa be regarded as ‘existentials’ rather than ‘modalities’ of occupation. I explore themes that Jansson and Wagman noted as our points of difference: Vita activa and vita contemplativa; The existence of human nature; and Whether occupation is conditioned, and both individualistic and pluralistic. To these I add a fifth: On not being conditioned absolutely. The line of inquiry then opens towards regarding Arendt’s existentials as a way of forming evaluative judgements about the human condition. Arendt’s text leads towards two plausible but conflicting interpretations; one tends towards a psychological account, the other towards opening a space for political freedom. Another question involves asking how the terms ‘being’ and ‘doing’ are related in occupational science and in Arendt’s politically oriented thought. It is argued she ranks them equally, but this is evaluative, not ontological. Arendt’s thought on the inability of science to explain what we are or answer the question of who we are, leads her in a political direction. Two implications for occupational science are drawn: that the first task is to make information about labor, work, and action available for evaluation, which leads directly into posing questions of social and occupational justice.