The Virtue of Moral Reflectiveness

Abstract

In this chapter I wish to draw attention to a specific retrospective moral state and argue that it constitutes a virtue. I will call this state ‘moral reflectiveness’. Some degree of it is a feature of all competent moral agency, and in my view, its deep and enduring possession holds a central — but rarely recognised or acknowledged — place in our conception of what constitutes a worthwhile or admirable moral life. One of the standard or typical practical expressions of moral reflectiveness, ‘moral reflection’, refers to a particular way in which morally conscious people in general, and morally reflective people in particular, critically reflect on moral features of their own lives — their moral experience. The disposition to engage in moral reflection is a central component of moral reflectiveness. In order to explain moral reflectiveness with some degree of clarity, it will be useful to approach my initial account through the description of moral reflection. Moral reflection in turn is perhaps best described via a feasible general account of consciousness and moral consciousness. This is what I initially set out to do.