Kant’s Morally Reflective First Command?

Abstract

In Chapters 3 and 4, I argued that neither Socrates (as Plato represents him) nor Aristotle, both seminal figures in ancient Greek ethics and the history of moral theory, leave theoretical space in which to properly recognise moral reflectiveness or take it seriously as a virtue. Another central figure in the same history, whose views still heavily influence much contemporary moral philosophy, is Immanuel Kant. Kant’s theory, in contrast to the ancient Greeks, accentuates and accords a central place to the roles of conscience and critical examination — including self-examination — in moral agency. Kant holds that we are obliged to critically assess the moral status of our proposed actions and the maxims they express through his famous categorical imperative. Seen from this perspective, Kant’s theory, accommodating as it is to the general concept of critical moral assessment, appears to be fertile ground for consideration of moral reflectiveness. Since Kant takes critical moral examination to be central in moral agency, perhaps he leaves room too for taking moral reflectiveness seriously as a virtue. As we shall see, Kant comes closer than either Socrates or Aristotle to according moral reflectiveness its full value. However, before moral reflectiveness comes into consideration, there is an obstacle to overcome: the traditional view of Kant, especially among those sympathetic to the revived virtue tradition, is that he does not accord any virtue irreducible moral value.