Abstract
In autumn of 1962 the Kennedy Administration recorded a striking success in foreign affairs. By signaling the U.S. commitment to the removal of Soviet strategic weapons from Cuba through a series of incremental steps, President Kennedy realized his commitment while avoiding a military conflict with the Soviet Unioni. Yet between 1964 and 1968 the Johnson Administration slowly destroyed itself by miring the nation in a tragic conflict through a series of incremenital signals of its commitment in Southeast Asia. For such extremes of success and failure to follow so quickly from a common approach to conflict is naturally perplexing for policy makers and academic strategists alike. The partial explanation of the disparity between the Cuban and Southeast Asian cases offered here is based on the incomplete data available for these conflicts. It is premature in both of these instances to pretend to a thorough analysis which
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