The Value of Rational Nature

Abstract

Kant tells us in the Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals that rational nature is an end in itself; that it is the only thing which is unconditionally valuable; and that it is the ultimate condition of all value. A striking trend in recent Kant scholarship is to regard these value claims, rather than the formalism of universalizability, as the ultimate foundation of Kant’s theory. But does rational nature as Kant conceives it deserve such veneration? Can it really carry the world of value on its shoulders? I think not. As will become clear, I do not doubt the value of rational nature. My claim is rather that we cannot account for the value of rational nature if we conceive it as Kant does. Rational nature cannot be valuable in a Kantian world, where there are no self-subsistent principles about what are good states of affairs, or activities, or whatever, of the sort that a Moorean or a Platonist or a perfectionist believes in. My own views are generally Moorean, and I shall occasionally offer a Moorean perspective on the value of rational nature for comparative purposes, but my criticisms of the Kantian view could be made from an Aristotelian perspective as well, in which the agent pursues not the Good, but a good human life. My main object is not to develop any particular alternative to the Kantian view, but merely to show how unsatisfactory the Kantian view is when we look at it closely.