Abstract

Terms such as sanctity and inviolability have failed to provide a legally coherent or ethically sound principle upon which to determine the scope of the intrinsic value of life against extrinsic, quality‐of‐life considerations in a medical context. In their recent work, Margaret Brazier and Suzanne Ost introduce a new term, reverence for life, which they suggest may be more appropriate when attempting to navigate the murky waters of the meaning of life and the value that should be attached to it. They suggest that reverence should be utilised as an alternative that better reflects the nuances and the realities of the dilemma. This paper explores the existing difficulties before considering how the principle of reverence might provide a principled compromise over when the presumption in favour of preserving life should be rebutted.

Highlights

  • Understanding and interpreting the value of human life has troubled ethicists, theologians, philosophers and lawyers since the dawn of time

  • Drawing on the work of Brazier and Ost, this paper explores some of the conceptual difficulties inherent in assessing the value and importance that one should attach to human life

  • While we do not have the space to examine in detail exactly when the presumption should be rebutted in every case, we suggest a starting point for a more productive and effective debate

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Summary

UEA Law School and University of Manchester

Terms such as sanctity and inviolability have failed to provide a legally coherent or ethically sound principle upon which to determine the scope of the intrinsic value of life against extrinsic, quality-of-life considerations in a medical context. In their recent work, Margaret Brazier and Suzanne Ost introduce a new term, reverence for life, which they suggest may be more appropriate when attempting to navigate the murky waters of the meaning of life and the value that should be attached to it. This paper explores the existing difficulties before considering how the principle of reverence might provide a principled compromise over when the presumption in favour of preserving life should be rebutted

INTRODUCTION
CONCEPTUAL DIFFICULTIES WITH THE VALUE AND IMPORTANCE OF HUMAN LIFE
RECENT JUDICIAL INTERPRETATIONS OF THE VALUE OF LIFE
DEVISING A MORE PRINCIPLED APPROACH
CONCLUSION
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