The Untraceability of Structural Injustice

Abstract

Abstract In Chapter 5, ‘The Untraceability of Structural Injustice’, Jude Browne focuses on a particular element of Iris Marion Young’s seminal account of structural injustice—the untraceability of structural injustice. Browne suggests that untraceability is not only a constant theme in Young’s account of structural injustice; it could in fact be seen as a defining feature. Browne follows the logic of the claim that structural injustice is untraceable, to see where it leads in engaging with Young’s critics. Many intellectual disputes with Young’s work are built on the seemingly logical point that, if responsibility for structural injustice cannot be traced, then how can any particular individual, group, or institution be politically responsible for addressing it? Browne recognizes this question as a key element in understanding structural injustice, and while defending Young’s account in part, she suggests an alternative way of understanding the dynamic relationship between structural and traceable fault-based injustices. Rather than dividing structural injustice into different categories, Browne’s approach is to think about the potential for transition between structural injustice and fault-based injustices (such as direct and indirect discriminatory practices and policies). This is productive, she argues, for moving beyond the limits of liability as a way of approaching structural injustice.