Abstract
AbstractIn this article, adoption of “power‐based” bargaining by the United States in trade negotiations is evaluated. A simple game‐theoretic structure highlights use of “bargaining” tariffs by the United States elicited credible retaliation by China through a trigger strategy, bilateral tariffs returning to a Nash equilibrium. This has come at some cost to US consumers, taxpayers, and farmers, although the latter group has regained market share following implementation of the US–China Phase One Trade Agreement. Unfortunately, the Agreement fails to deal with a key reason for the trade war, the Chinese economic model, and China's use of implicit subsidies.
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