The Truman Administration and the Security Context

Abstract

Washington’s inordinate determination, following the Truman Doctrine, to assume unprecedented commitments to European stability, clouded the issue of military preparedness. Indeed, the perceived presence of Soviet expansionism in the creation of the Marshall Plan, and even the North Atlantic alliance, produced little examination of the levels of military preparedness required to defend the country’s, as well as Europe’s, security. The ubiquitous verbalization of Soviet ambitions, at times embracing immense regions of the world, created no real sense of military urgency at all. Rather, the exaggerated perceptions of danger that rationalized the Truman Doctrine, and the containment decisions that followed, confronted the military services with the admonition that they learn to survive with lower appropriations. For Clark Clifford, White House counsel, and George Elsey, Clifford’s assistant, the global Soviet threat did not rest on the expansive power of ideology alone. As the chapter will discuss, they accused the Kremlin of developing atomic and biological weapons, guided missiles, strategic air power, and submarines to extend “the effective range of Soviet military power well into areas which the United States regards vital to its security.” They recommended that the United States rebuild its military capabilities and “be prepared to wage atomic and biological warfare.” So frightening was the Clifford–Elsey case against the Soviet Union that Truman impounded all copies of their report. All in all, however, such growing fears and distrust of Soviet power would for the main extent eliminate what remained of the Grand Alliance and any chances of its revival.