Abstract

Following the American invasion and the ouster of the Taliban regime from Afghanistan in the wake of September 11 terrorist attack on the US, the American government poured trillions of dollars into the country to build democracy, and the army, to provide security for the country. However, the assistance was unable to bring to an end the friable nature of the state of Afghanistan under the Ghani government. Why was this so? Using the historical method and state fragility framework as a tool of analysis, the paper examined the factors that led to the collapse of the government under Ashraf Ghani, and the lessons it portrays for Nigeria, which is locked in a war with Boko Haram that shares similar fundamentalist ideology with the Taliban. The paper revealed several frailties that occasioned fragility of the Afghan state and the fall of Ghani’s government: factionalised elite, gargantuan corruption, a distraught and highly demoralised army, fast decaying public service, and impunity of American forces. Among the statecraft nuggets that Nigeria should learn to avoid similar experience, as suggested in the paper, include the need to urgently and sincerely address fragility issues in the country: corruption and insecurity, with unimpeachable carrot-and-stick approach in dealing with Boko Haram insurgency, among others.

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