The Surprisingly Strong Case for Tailoring Constitutional Principles

Abstract

INTRODUCTION 1515 I. ONE-SIZE-FITS-ALL AND TAILORING IDENTIFIED 1523 A. A Simple Jurisprudential Model 1524 B. Four Approaches to Constitutionally Limiting the Different Levels of Government 1527 1. Different Levels, Different Constitutional Principles: The Example of “Fundamental Fairness” 1528 2. Total Incorporation 1532 3. Selective Incorporation 1534 4. Tailoring: A Variant of Selective Incorporation 1536 C. One-Size-Fits-All Outside of the Fourteenth Amendment 1538 II. THE (ULTIMATELY) PRAGMATIC GROUNDS FOR ONE-SIZE-FITS-ALL 1541 A. The Disappointing Search for a Justification 1542 B. The “Watering-Down” Thesis and the Structure of Rights 1545 C. Plausible Justifications for Selective Incorporation and Their Relation to One-Size-Fits-All 1553 1. Limiting Judicial Discretion 1554 2. Judicial Administration 1555 III. A QUASI-PRECEDENTIAL ARGUMENT: THAT TAILORING IS NOT UNKNOWN TO AMERICAN JURISPRUDENCE 1557 A. Early Influential Support for Tailoring 1557 B. Contemporary Constitutional Decisions that Reflect the Logic of Tailoring 1562 1. Federal Affirmative Action Programs 1562 2. Property-Based Franchise 1565 3. Separation-of-Powers Tailoring 1567 4. Dormant Commerce Clause 1571