Abstract
In this paper Matthew J. Knauff examines one of the four primary epistemic paradoxes set forth by Jonathan Kvanvig—the surprise examination paradox. He begins by offering a statement of the paradox, after which he considers a solution proposed by W.V.O. Quine. Knauff argues that Quine’s solution to the paradox must, for a number of reasons, be rejected. Finally, he offers aresolution to the paradox by means of his own approach.
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