The Subject in Carnap, Quine and Others

Abstract

AbstractThis chapter is a supplementary demonstration of the problem of subject in contemporary philosophy raised in the last chapter. I will examine more examples in more detail, to show that philosophers who apparently favor physicalism frequently presuppose a non-physical Subject of cognition in their philosophical concepts and views. Two case-studies on Carnap and Quine will be presented in Sects. 2.1 and 2.2 respectively. Both Carnap and Quine apparently favor physicalism. However, I will show how some of their assertions implicitly but indispensably presuppose the image of a Subject versus the External World and therefore presuppose a non-physical Subject. I will argue that this fact threatens the internal coherence of their philosophical positions. These analyses apply to many other contemporary philosophers as well, because they adopt the Carnapian and Quinean philosophical locution and thus share the image of a Subject versus the External World. Section 2.3 will continue to examine a few more philosophical concepts and views, showing that traditional understandings of them presuppose the image of a Subject versus the External World. I hope these detailed analyses can convince philosophers that there is a serious problem of subject in contemporary philosophy.KeywordsNo-selfSubjectCarnapQuinePhysicalismAbstract object