Introduction: Steps Toward No-Self Physicalism

Abstract

AbstractThis chapter first argues that there is a serious problem in contemporary philosophy: given contemporary cognitive science on human cognitive (vs. phenomenal experiential and spiritual) activities, we should admit that human cognitive subjects are human brains, not any non-physical, amorphous, soul-like Subject hiding inside a brain, but many traditional philosophical concepts and theories exactly presuppose a non-physical Subject of cognition. This presupposition threatens the internal coherence of many philosophers’ philosophical positions, irrespective of whether they endorse physicalism or naturalism. For sympathizers of physicalism, recognizing this problem should motivate No-Self Physicalism, a version of physicalism that calls for renewing the entire traditional philosophy to get rid of all presuppositions of non-physical Subjects and redefine philosophical concepts and reconstruct philosophical theories by explicitly treating human brains as the subjects of cognition and action. No-Self Physicalism is a framework for doing philosophy in all philosophical areas, not just a metaphysical position in philosophy of mind. After motivating No-self Physicalism this way, this chapter will elaborate the major ideas of No-Self Physicalism and summarize reasons supporting them. These together constitute an introduction to No-Self Physicalism, while Chaps. 3–8 of this book belong to doing real philosophy under the framework of No-Self Physicalism.KeywordsNo-self physicalismSubjectSelfNaturalismPhenomenal experienceMultiple realizability