The Struggle to Transform the Military

Abstract

REVOLUTION, INTERRUPTED DONALD RUMSFELD'S tenure as secretary of defense will continue to be marked by his attempt to transform the military into a lighter, nimbler force better able to take advantage of new technology and respond to new threats. Despite (or perhaps because of) the rancor he has generated within the Pentagon, Rumsfeld has managed to shake up a hidebound institution that, if left to its own devices, would probably prefer to endlessly refight the 1991 Gulf War. The continued fighting in Iraq, however, shows the limits of what he has accomplished. The U.S. military is superb at defeating conventional forces-as its three-week blitzkrieg from Kuwait to Baghdad in the spring of 2003 demonstrated-but not nearly as good at fighting the kind of guerrilla foes it has confronted since. To be sure, many of the current problems in Iraq result from Rumsfeld's failure to send enough troops there and from the precipitous disbandment of the Iraqi military. But they also reveal more ftindamental short comings in U.S. capabilities for dealing with unconventional threats. Many policymakers and military officers will no doubt react to the problems in Iraq by trying to eschew this type of conflict in the ftiture. Just as there was an aversion to fighting guerrilla wars after Vietnam (manifested in the Powell Doctrine), there will be a similar backlash