The Status of Altruism

Abstract

i. In The Possibility of Altruism, Nagel argues that an awareness of the benefit or harm an action will cause to another can in itself, without our having to assume the agent to possess any specific desires he might conceivably not possess, move an agent to perform or desist from that action. Hence his claim to have demonstrated the possibility of altruism, the possibility of acting simply out of regard for the welfare of another. I want to suggest that it is possible to argue for something a little stronger: not, perhaps, the necessity of altruism but at any rate something more than its bare possibility. It may be that something stronger follows from Nagel's own arguments, but that is not a possibility I shall explore. I want to focus upon the more specific question of our response to the distress of others. I shall argue that it is a necessary truth that to perceive another's distress as distress is to perceive it as prima facie a bad thing, as other things being equal something to be avoided or prevented. This does not mean that to perceive another's distress is necessarily to be moved to prevent it. What it does mean is that where someone is not moved to prevent distress, where they are unmoved or are moved in some other way-amused, excited, pleased or whatever, we must either deny that they are genuinely aware of the other's distress or find, in the special character of their view of that person in particular or the world in general, an explanation of why they should take what is prima facie an evil to be amusing, exciting, gratifying, or whatever.