The state, hate speech regulation and sustainable democracy in Africa: a study of Nigeria and Kenya

This paper critiques the version of the argument that the regulation of hateful speech by the state undermines its democratic legitimacy made by Ronald Dworkin and James Weinstein (hereafter the Legitimacy Argument). It argues that in some cases the harmful effects of hateful speech on the democratic process outweigh those of restriction. It does not challenge the central premise of the Legitimacy Argument, that a wide-ranging right to freedom of expression is an essential political right in a liberal democracy. Instead, it uses ideal and nonideal theory as a framework for judgements about the regulation of hate speech. The mistake underpinning the Legitimacy Argument is that it assumes that other conditions pervade that make an ideal democratic procedure possible when they do not. In reality the state can be put in a position where, whatever course of action it takes with regard to the regulation or non-regulation of hate speech, some citizens will not be able to participate fully in political deliberation. Under such conditions there remain strong pro tanto reasons not to regulate hate speech on democratic grounds, but they are not all-things-considered reasons, and there are also pro tanto reasons to regulate hate speech that might outweigh them in some cases. This leads to the cautious conclusion that while there might be a normative justification for the regulation of hate speech in individual instances, the debate is best understood as one between competing pro tanto reasons, and must be approached on a case-by-case basis.

Hate Speech and Human Rights. Democracies need to understand these terms to properly adapt their legal frameworks. Regulation of hate speech exposes underlining and sometimes invisible societal values such as security and public order, equality and non-discrimination, human dignity, and other democratic vital interests. The spread of hatred and hate speech has intensified in many corners of the world over the last decade and its regulation presents a conundrum for many democracies. This book presents a three-prong theory describing three different but complementary models of hate speech regulation which allows stakeholders to better address this phenomenon. It examines international and national legal frameworks and related case law as well as pertinent scholarly literature review to highlight this development. After a period of an absence of free speech during communism, post-communist democracies have sought to build a framework for the exercise of free speech while protecting public goods such as liberty, equality and human dignity. The three-prong theory is applied to identify public goods and values underlining the regulation of hate speech in the Czech Republic and Slovakia, two countries that share a political, sociological, and legal history, as an example of the differing approaches to hate speech regulation in post-communist societies due to divergent social values, despite identical legal frameworks. This book will be of great interest to scholars of human rights law, lawyers, judges, government, NGOs, media and anyone who would like to understand values that underpin hate speech regulations which reflect values that society cherishes the most.

The Hate Speech Diversion

This Essay on the regulation of hate speech and pornography addresses both practicalities and principles. I take it as a given that we live in a society marred by racial and gender inequality, that certain forms of speech perpetuate and promote this inequality, and that the uncoerced disappearance of such speech would be cause for great elation. I do not take it as a given that all governmental efforts to regulate such speech thus accord with the Constitution. What is more (and perhaps what is more important), the Supreme Court does not, and will not in the foreseeable future, take this latter proposition as a given either. If confirmation of this point were needed, it came last year in the shape of the Court's opinion in R.A.V. v City of St. Paul.' There, the Court struck down a so-called hate speech ordinance, in the process reiterating, in yet strengthened form, the tenet that the First Amendment presumptively prohibits the regulation of speech based upon its content, and especially upon its viewpoint. That decision demands a change in the nature of the debate on pornography and hate speech regulation. It does so for principled reasons-because it raises important and valid questions about which approaches to the regulation of hate speech and pornography properly should succeed in the courts. And it does so for purely pragmatic reasons-because it makes clear that certain approaches almost surely will not succeed. In making this claim, I do not mean to suggest that all efforts to regulate pornography and hate speech be suspended, on the

The main problem in this thesis is the regulation of hate speech in Law Number 7 of 2017, because when the agenda for a democratic party or also known as elections is approaching, the behavior of hate speech has greatly increased. Certain groups of candidates may clash with other supporting groups, so that Article 28E paragraph (3) of the 1945 Constitution of the Republic of Indonesia, "everyone has the right to freedom of association, assembly and expression of opinions", is very vulnerable to dealing with the right to freedom of opinion and expression. The purpose of this study is to find out more about the regulation of hate speech in Law Number 7 of 2017 concerning general elections and siyasa dusturiyyah reviews. To answer the object of the study, the authors used library research using a normative juridical approach with statutory and conceptual approaches. In this case, it includes primary legal materials, namely from laws and regulations, especially Law Number 7 of 2017 concerning Elections and secondary legal materials from legal and Islamic books and journals. In the research that the authors conducted, it can be concluded that, until now, hate speech in elections in Indonesia has not been clearly interpreted, even in Law Number 7 of 2017 concerning General Elections (Elections) it is not explained in detail regarding how to define, victims, perpetrators, sanctions imposed as well as benchmarks or limitations that can be categorized as hate speech in elections. Law Number 7 of 2017 concerning Elections in fiqh siyasa dusturiyyah, the source of its formation is siyasah wad'iyah because it is produced by mere human thought products which in the drafting process do not pay attention to norms and ethics. Hate speech in Islam is a prohibited act because it can cause harm, especially to the soul, and in it has an element of humiliation, namely lowering one's self-esteem/soul, which should be maintained or guarded for every human being from any group as per the concept of the formulation of the basis of the state (fiqh siyasa dusturiyyah). and the principle is to prioritize guarantees of human rights and realize justice.

Hate speech, generally, is considered an expression of intolerance towards a definite group, and very often such communication provokes a kind of violence. Stimulation of abhorrence refers to a group of persons determined on the basis of race, ethnical identity, nationality, gender, religion, or sexual orientation, as a rule, it refers to minorities. However, all countries have their own unique contexts that complicate a vivid determination of so called “hate speech”. In some cases, all kinds of negative expressions being humiliating, insolent, slanderous, or discriminative ones towards anybody are perceived by the community and/or separate groups as hate speech. Unclearness of perceiving the hate speech was demonstrated by discussions on media regulation in Georgia held in 2019 when the government expressed a desire, motivated by the necessity of regulation of the hate speech, to change a system of media self-regulation existing in Georgia. Many initiatives were expressed and they were targeted to make the hate speech applied in media punitive and regulatory. The research is conducted using a qualitative methodology. We have analyzed a practice of self-regulation of the hate speech in Georgia within the year 2019, and selected cases that were high-sounding in TV media outlets resulted in broad discussions and which had been discussed by the self-regulatory authorities. In addition to analyzing of the cases and observing decisions made by the self-regulatory authorities, we have also used a method of profound interviews. As we have mentioned above, we have selected two high-sounding cases in the most interesting period of the research (2019). For both periods of the research, it was an author text of the anchor man of the national broadcasting company “Rustavi 2”. The first case was considered personally by the self-regulation council of the Rustavi 2 as well as by the Georgian Charter of Journalistic Ethics. We have analyzed two different approaches applied by both self-regulatory councils. We received similar results of radically different interpretations of self-regulatory authorities as a result of conducting deep interviews. Representatives of parties consider that the text expresses a hate speech towards Christians, but representatives of civil organizations and academic fields of universities do not consider that the text had been discriminative towards anybody. One of the explanations was as follows: “The given example is unlikely in compliance with a definition establishing the hate speech. It represents a subjective opinion of a definite journalist. I think that it does not collide with constitutional norms of freedom of speech, neither is considered a humiliating act against religious feelings as the religious passage was devoted to the discretion of a definite politics and not for the discrimination of this confession. Analyses of both examples demonstrated that understanding and perception of the term hate speech are not clearly formed neither in general society nor in professional circles of Georgia. The hate speech is often put on the same level as the humiliating and indecent expressions. Approaches and explanations of media self-regulatory boards are quite different. The present research partially confirmed a hypothesis that stakeholders interpret hate speech with a broad understanding which considers indecent and humiliating expressions. It was also completely confirmed that interpretation and regulation of hate speech with a broad understanding in practice bears definite risks for freedom of media in fragile democracies.

The Internet is a global forum largely governed by private actors driven by profit concerns, often disregarding the human rights of historically marginalised communities. Increased attention is being paid to the corporate human rights due diligence (HRDD) responsibilities applicable to online platforms countering illegal online content, such as hate speech. At the European Union (EU) level, cross-sector initiatives regulate the rights of marginalised groups and establish HRDD responsibilities for online platforms to expeditiously identify, prevent, mitigate, remedy and remove online hate speech. These initiatives include the Digital Services Act, the Audiovisual Media Services Directive, the proposed Directive on Corporate Sustainability Due Diligence, the proposed Artificial Intelligence Act and the Code of conduct on countering illegal hate speech online. Nevertheless, the HRDD framework applicable to online hate speech has focused mostly on the platforms’ responsibilities throughout the course of their operations - guidance regarding HRDD requirements concerning the regulation of hate speech in the platforms’ Terms of Service (ToS) is missing. This paper employs a conceptualisation of criminal hate speech as explained in the Council of Europe Committee of Ministers’ Recommendation CM/Rec(2022)16, Paragraph 11, to develop specific HRDD responsibilities. We argue that online platforms should, as part of emerging preventive HRDD responsibilities within Europe, respect the rights of historically oppressed communities by aligning their ToS with the conceptualisation of criminal hate speech in European human rights standards.

This paper examines the contrasting approaches to regulating hate speech and misinformation in Europe and the U.S., with a focus on the role of social media. Guided by interpretations of Article 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights, European nations maintain latitude to restrict speech harmful to society, including hate speech and misinformation. Conversely, in the U.S., the U.S. Supreme Court’s First Amendment jurisprudence places significant burdens on the State’s ability to regulate hate speech and misinformation. While hate speech and falsities can cause both individual and social harm, there are deleterious impacts of empowering the State to regulate these ideas. When the State can eliminate hate speech and false ideas from public discourse, society’s ability to challenge those ideas is diminished, resulting in indolent public discourse. Moreover, in democratic states, the majority will inevitably define hate speech and truth, and those definitions can change with control of the State. To ensure consistency and legitimacy as control of the State changes, an unfettered marketplace of ideas must be allowed to flourish. The importance of ensuring that unfettered marketplace of ideas has never been more important considering the rise of social media. When the State extends its regulation of hate speech and lies to social media platforms, it exerts control over the locus of the most diverse group of ideas in human history.

This article reveals how the heterogeneous legal approaches of balancing online hate speech against equality rights in liberal democracies have informed China in its manipulative speech regulation. In an authoritarian constitutional order, the regulation of hate speech is politically relevant only because the hateful topics are related to regime-oriented concerns. The article elaborates on the infrastructure of an emerging authoritarian regulatory patchwork of online hate speech in the global context and identifies China’s unique approach of restricting political contents under the aegis of protecting equality rights. Ultimately, both the regulation and dis-regulation of online hate speech form a statist approach that deviates from the paradigm protective of equality rights in liberal democracies and serves to fend off open criticism of government policies and public discussion of topics that potentially contravene the mainstream political ideologies.

Hate speech (‘al-jahr bi’-sūʾ min al-qawlin the Qur’anic description) continues to be the subject of contentious debate. Arguably, the notion of “unregulated speech” in the liberal discourse encourages hate speech on the pretext of “defending” the right to freedom of speech. Islam recogniseshuman dignityas the underlying basis of all human rights and freedoms, including the right to freedom of speech. Here arise two core questions. First, is freedom of speech and expression an absolute right or has Islam imposed certainconditionson the human agency while this right is exercised? Second, what do theseconditionsconcerning freedom of speech imply about the regulation of hate speech? I approach these questions by beginning with the introduction ofkaramahprinciple followed by an overview of theoretical conceptualisations of free speech in the Western context. Finally, the Islamic position on the subject is brought forth through the conceptual analysis of relevant Islamic texts. The article draws three conclusions. First, human dignity is the intrinsic condition that surpasses all rights and freedoms. Second, the idea of “unregulated speech” is controversial and has been a reason forharminghuman dignity and making the public discourse inimical to social order. Third, there should be a legal, moral and rational reconciliation between exercising ‘speech limitations’ and ‘free speech’ to ensure sustainable peace and social cohesion.

Freedom of expression is not absolute right and may be restricted for the sake of protecting other fundamental human rights in accordance with law. Online social Media is unlike print media, tend to be unregulated and provide services being manipulated all over the world. Hate speech should not be hided under the protective umbrella of freedom of speech or expression. There must have a clear demarcation between free speech and hate speech. Accordingly, the main objective of the article is to examine international legal instruments, Ethiopian legal frameworks and institutional setting which regulate hate speech. In order to achieve the intended aims, the study employed doctrinal legal research on which legal analysis of the principal legislations. In so doing, the result of findings identified a lot of legal vacuums with regards to hate speech. Further, the existing FDRE proclamation No.1185/2020 provides responsibilities of service provider institutions to suppress and prevent dissemination of hate speech; however, the practical enforcement of hate speech legislation in Ethiopia suffers challenges inter-alia: absence of uniform definition, contents and scope of hate speech, anonymity, jurisdiction etc. Finally, the study used OSCOLA rule of reference in this article.

Hate speech employs discriminatory epithets to insult and stigmatize others on the basis of their race, gender, sexual orientation, or other forms of group membership. The regulation of hate speech is deservedly controversial, in part because debates over hate speech seem to have teased apart libertarian and egalitarian strands within the liberal tradition. In the civil rights movements of the 1960s, libertarian concerns with freedom of movement and association and equal opportunity pointed in the same direction as egalitarian concerns with eradicating racial discrimination and the social and economic inequalities that this discrimination maintained. But debates over hate speech regulation seem to force one to give priority to equality or to liberty. On the one hand, egalitarian concerns may seem to require restricting freedom of expression. Hate speech is an expression of discriminatory attitudes that have a long, ugly, and sometimes violent history. As such, hate speech is deeply offensive to its victims and socially divisive. Though one might well be reluctant to restrict speech, it might seem that the correct response to hate speech, as with other forms of discrimination, is regulation. On the other hand, libertarian concerns may seem to constrain the pursuit of equality. Though one may abhor hate speech and its effects, the cure might seem at least as bad as the disease. Freedoms of expression are among our most fundamental liberties. Offensive ideas are part of the price one must pay to protect these constitutional rights.

Previous articleNext article No AccessLiberalism and Campus Hate Speech: A Philosophical ExaminationAndrew AltmanAndrew Altman Search for more articles by this author PDFPDF PLUS Add to favoritesDownload CitationTrack CitationsPermissionsReprints Share onFacebookTwitterLinkedInRedditEmail SectionsMoreDetailsFiguresReferencesCited by Ethics Volume 103, Number 2Jan., 1993 Article DOIhttps://doi.org/10.1086/293497 Views: 140Total views on this site Citations: 33Citations are reported from Crossref Copyright 1993 The University of ChicagoPDF download Crossref reports the following articles citing this article:Suzanne Whitten Critical Republicanism and Harmful Speech, (Oct 2021): 85–133.https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-78631-1_4Suzanne Whitten Questioning the Non-Interference Paradigm, (Oct 2021): 17–50.https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-78631-1_2Jessica Flanigan, Alec Greven SPEECH AND CAMPUS INCLUSIVITY, Public Affairs Quarterly 35, no.33 (Jul 2021): 178–203.https://doi.org/10.2307/48628247Susan J. 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A sociedade global e as novas tecnologias modificaram a produção, a disseminação e as regulações sobre discursos de ódio, principalmente aqueles expressados on-line. De um lado, as empresas transnacionais de mídias sociais possuem políticas de publicidade com diretrizes para remover conteúdos considerados como discurso de ódio ou expressões semelhantes. De outro, o direito internacional dos direitos humanos, que fornece diretrizes interpretativas para a problemática à luz do direito à liberdade de expressão, emite preocupações sobre como essas normatizações de empresas de mídias sociais são geridas e operacionalizadas. Nesse sentido, o objetivo deste estudo é analisar o panorama das diferentes regulações normativas que recaem sobre o fenômeno do discurso de ódio à luz da perspectiva do pluralismo jurídico. Além disso, a pesquisa investiga se a autorregulação regulada pode ser considerada uma ferramenta estratégica para auxiliar na proteção da liberdade de expressão, e lidar com a complexibilidade das dinâmicas da sociedade global em relação aos discursos de ódio on-line. A metodologia utilizada é de natureza hipotético-dedutiva, com levantamento bibliográfico e documental a respeito dos temas relacionados. Os resultados indicam que a autorregulação regulada pode ser considerada uma ferramenta estratégica para conciliar a dinâmica específica das plataformas digitais de mídias sociais com as regulações do sistema jurídico oficial sobre os temas.&#x0D; &#x0D; &#x0D; Abstract: The global society and new technologies have changed the production, dissemination, and regulation of hate speech, especially those expressed online. On one hand, the advertising policies for transnational social media companies include guidelines for removing hate speech content or similar expressions. From another, the international human rights law has concerns about how these social media company policies are managed and operationalized in relation to the right to freedom of expression. In this sense, the objective of this study is to analyze the panorama of the different normative regulations on hate speech in the light of perspective of legal pluralism. In addition, the study investigates if the regulated self-regulation can be considered a strategic tool to help protect freedom of expression in the complexity of global society dynamics about hate speech online. The methodology used is based on the hypothetical-deductive method, with bibliographic and documentary revision. The results indicate that regulated self-regulation can be considered a strategic tool to conciliate the specific dynamics of social medias platforms and the regulations of the official legal system.&#x0D; Keywords: Hate speech; Legal pluralism; Transnational regulations; Social medias; Regulated self-regulation.&#x0D; &#x0D; &#x0D; Recebido em: outubro/2019.&#x0D; Aprovado em: agosto/2020.

The spread of hatred and hate speech has intensified in many corners of the world in the last decade and there is more and more political and academic debate about its proper regulation. The study offers a twofold outcome: it approaches the challenges of hate speech regulation by offering an understanding of public goods worthy of protection in a democracy; and it analyzes the rationale, the arguments, and the ideas behind hate speech regulation in two countries that share political, sociological, and legal history, namely the Czech Republic and Slovakia. In this regard, it works with the hypothesis that hate speech, as a political, legal, and social term changes in time. The research involves a normative analysis of international and national legal frameworks, case-law, and pertinent scholarly literature reviews. Understanding the model these young democracies adopted sheds more light on the protection and conception of values such as security and public order, equality and non-discrimination, human dignity, and other interests, which underpin post-communist societies in these countries. The aim of this research is to discover what these values are and their related interests.