Abstract
The article is a two-pronged study. From the initial assumption that the act of incitement is a perlocutionary act, which depends for its success on hearer cooperation, it is shown that what makes a speech act an act of incitement depends solely on its interpretation in the situation in which it is performed; the hearer may be the potential object of the speech act, but its performance occurs without his/her active participation. This analysis for incitement conforms with its status in legal discourse. The second, wider, issue is the entire question of perlocutionary acts and their place in speech act theory in particular and in pragmatics in general. On the basis of an analysis of the act of persuasion as well as of that of incitement, it seems that what is of concern to pragmatics is the illocutionary act with the speaker's purpose as an integral part, while the actual effect on the hearer is not a necessary condition.
Talk to us
Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have
Schedule a callDisclaimer: All third-party content on this website/platform is and will remain the property of their respective owners and is provided on "as is" basis without any warranties, express or implied. Use of third-party content does not indicate any affiliation, sponsorship with or endorsement by them. Any references to third-party content is to identify the corresponding services and shall be considered fair use under The CopyrightLaw.
