The content and form of illocutionary acts

Abstract

As is well known, Searle s interpretation of speech acts is based on pure pragmatic assumptions. This is demonstrated not only by the fact that he focuses his major attention on sentence and verbs (actually only performative verbs) and their semantics. The pragmatic basis is also shown by the fact that the meaning a particular sentence may have is studied in different situations. This is evident from the attention Searle pays to the analysis of individual illocutionary verbs and the relationships between them. These relationships are illustrated by semantic charts (tabulated in his original version) where it is primarily the succession relationships between these verbs in the given semantic field presented for inspection. The relationship is characterized by raising degree of an illocutionary force, or necessity (1985). However, when the conditions of communication are elucidated and the success of communicative acts is being investigated it can be seen that a communicative aspexct is being significantly applied (though different than in W. Schmidt s theory). The first sentence of the work already states that the smallest unit of human communication is represented by speech acts of the type denominated as the illocutionary acts (Searle refers to Austin as to the author of this term). The communicative viewpoint is the basis also for D. Wunderlich (1986), who distinguishes between the illocutionary act (Ausserungsakt) and the speech act (Sprechakt), accentuating that acts of both kinds are actually single (unrepeated) acts, or events: the illocutionary act is implemented through an utterance, and the speech act constitutes the purpose of the utterance (p. 57). In this sense also M. Grepl (1986) – following F. Danes (1983) – distinguishes the utterance and the communicative function. This communicative function is considered the basic unit of an interhuman language action, the goal of the original utterance whilst the utterance itself is secondary, itself being the product of the communicative function. In this sense it seems almost possible to identify Grepl’s communicative function with the notion of a rhetoric function (for more information, see the recent survey article by P.L. Rounds 1987), or with that of the communicative procedure – Kommunikationsverfahren according to W. Schmidt. W. Schmidt’s theory, however, is based on speech action (not on utterance), and the communicative procedure is defined as the elaboration of the communication object serving the superior intention (Michel 1982). As seen from these introductory remarks, there is great discrepancy between the various theoretical sources about what is considered to be the basis, the methods and also the terminology. Therefore I find it useful to focus attention on three essential points: the relationship between terms and notions used by different authors, the position of the speech act in relation to the utterance and sentence, and finally, the essential constitutive elements or features of the speech act. With this basis an attempt will be made to construct a system of illocutionary acts. A speech act, Sprechakt, is traditionally the fundamental notion. Its definition still has not been unified. Searle often avoids speaking of the speech act, and instead speaks, more narrowly, of the illocutionary act. This notion is elucidated on the basis of its relationships to such types of speech acts (p. 80) as the elocutionary act, the propositional act, the indirect speech act, the perlocutionary act, and conversation (p. 80). The illocutionary act is