The Special Tribunal for Lebanon

Abstract

Abstract The article aims to discuss some of the underlying factors that have significantly hindered the ability of the Special Tribunal for Lebanon (STL, or ‘the Tribunal’) to fulfil its mandate — bringing those responsible for the assassination of former Prime Minister Rafik Hariri and others to justice, and thereby bringing justice to victims. Since its inception, the Tribunal has been received with mixed feelings. On the one hand, given the inability and unwillingness of Lebanese domestic courts to deal with gross human rights violations — including heinous terrorist crimes — the establishment of a judicial body was considered indispensable to ending impunity for such crimes. On the other hand, the Tribunal has been perceived as selective and the outcome of a politically-convenient temporary impetus. Adopting a Third World Approach to International Law, the article argues that the model applied in establishing the STL adopted most of the shortcomings of international criminal justice. Furthermore, considering the perceptions of the Tribunal’s legacy among victims and the public in Lebanon and in the wider region, it is no less contentious from a transitional justice perspective. The article concludes that such a model, due to its legal, structural, policy, and management shortcomings, has failed to fulfil its mandate and there are lessons that can be learnt from this contentious experience.