Abstract

Abstract For the peoples of the Soviet Union, war is a very real possibility. They live on past battlefields and realize that, in the event of another major war, their country will be a battlefield once again. Consequently, theoretical constructs designed primarily for maintaining the peace rather than dominating the battlefield do not satisfy their desire for a strong defense. Unlike many Western military analysts, who focus on how a war might begin, Soviet strategists are more concerned with examining how it would end. This does not mean they neglect the political side of military power; rather, it merely reflects their conviction that the political utility of military power is a function of its combat effectiveness.

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