Abstract
China's state development was shaped by elite network structures that characterized state–society relations, rather than representative institutions or bellicist competition. For the 2,000 years of its existence, its rulers faced the sovereign's dilemma: a coherent elite that could take collective action to strengthen the state could also overthrow the ruler. When elites were in geographically broad and densely interconnected networks, they preferred a strong state capable of protecting their far-flung interests, and their cohesiveness constituted a threat to the ruler's survival. Yet when elites relied on local bases of power and were not tightly connected, they instead sought to hollow out the central state from within; their internal divisions enabled the ruler to play competing factions against each other to secure his personal survival. This capacity–survival tradeoff explains China's historical state development and highlights the importance of elite social relations in understanding alternative paths of state development outside Europe.
Sign-in/Register to access full text options 
Talk to us
Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have
Schedule a callDisclaimer: All third-party content on this website/platform is and will remain the property of their respective owners and is provided on "as is" basis without any warranties, express or implied. Use of third-party content does not indicate any affiliation, sponsorship with or endorsement by them. Any references to third-party content is to identify the corresponding services and shall be considered fair use under The CopyrightLaw.
