The Southeastern Anatolia Project (GAP): An Obstacle to Turkish Accession to the European Union?

Abstract

26 Journal of South Asian and Middle Eastern Studies Vol. XL, No.1, Fall 2016 The Southeastern Anatolia Project (GAP): An Obstacle to Turkish Accession to the European Union? Cemal Ozkahraman* Michael M. Gunter** Michael M. Gunter, Jr *** Introduction During the Cold War, the world was divided into two predominant orders: capitalism (US/Western Europe) and communism (Soviet Union/Eastern Europe), and world politics revolved entirely around these two blocs. However, when the Cold War ended, in particular when Soviet leaders declared their readiness to withdraw their troops from the rest of Eastern Europe in 1995,1 the old international order rapidly crumbled and a “new world order” began, which supposedly required that political power should not be handled by nation-states, but instead by actors in democratic global governance such as international institutions including the United Nations (UN), the European Union (EU) and other non-governmental organizations which were intended to support democracy by forcing states to uphold its principles and allow the citizens of the globe to enjoy *Cemal Ozkahraman earned his PhD in 2016 from Exeter University in the UK and is currently an independent scholar. **Michael M. Gunter is a professor of political science at Tennessee Technological University. His most recent book is The Kurds: A Modern History, 2nd ed. (Princeton: Markus Wiener Publishers, 2017). *** Michael M. Gunter, Jr. is a Cornell Distinguished Professor and chair of political science at Rollins College where he directs the international affairs program for their Holt School. He is author of the forthcoming Tales of an Ecotourist: What Travel to Wild Places Teaches Us about Climate Change with SUNY press. 1 Anderson, W.E., Gutmainis, I., and D.L. Anderson, Economic Power in a Changing International System (London: Cassell, 2000). 27 2 Held, D., Democracy and the Global Order (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1995). 3 Müftüler-Baç, M., “The Never-Ending Story: Turkey and the European Union,” in Sylvia Kedourie, ed., Turkey Before and After Ataturk: Internal and External Affairs (London: Frank Cass, 1999). 4 For background, see Gunter, M., “Turkey’s Floundering EU Candidacy and Its Kurdish Problem,” Middle East Policy 14 (Spring 2007), pp. 117-23. fundamental human rights as well as promote the functioning of a democratic market economy.2 In this context, the EU required that countries wanting to join would have to redesign their internal and external politics in the framework of its own criteria based on democratic principles. For instance, Central/Eastern European nations emerging from the Cold War period have had to follow the new world order and accept such criteria in order to gain accession. Turkey, which since its creation has been attempting to become part of “European civilization,” and has consequently been knocking on the EU door in order to take its place in the club, was asked to ensure: (i) stable institutions governing democracy; (ii) the rule of law, respect for human rights and protection of minorities; the existence of a functioning market economy and the capacity to cope with competitive pressure; and (iii) the ability to take on the obligations of membership including adherence to the principles of political, economic and monetary union.3 In order to take its place in the EU, Turkey has undergone significant domestic political transformations.4 Alongside adoption of a fully neo-liberal development model, for the first time in its history it has begun to recognize the existence of its Kurdish minority, having earlier refused to accept its existence in Turkey. More importantly, Turkey has established a major water project on the Euphrates and Tigris rivers, the Southeastern Anatolia Project (GAP), which it aimed to use for the social development of the most underdeveloped part of Turkey, the south-east, which is also the Kurdish region, and aimed to diminish the socio-economic gap between the southeast /Kurds and the rest of Turkey, something which it had ignored since the creation of the republic. The $32 billion (US) project was initiated mainly for the purpose of hydroelectric power production and irrigation in the 1950s, led by the Turkish General Directorate of State Hydraulic Works (Devlet Su Isleri (DSI)), but by the late 1980s the GAP infrastructure incorporated a “social development” programme through...